

Green International Response to the Humanitarian Crisis In Sudan 2023-2025

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Abstract

The humanitarian crisis in Sudan, triggered by the armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) since April 2023, has become one of the world's largest displacement and famine crises, affecting more than 30 million people in need of assistance. Yet the international response to Sudan remains strikingly limited compared to crises such as Gaza and Ukraine. This study aims to analyze the international response to the humanitarian crisis in Sudan and to explain why the scale of suffering is not the only determinant of global attention and aid. Using a qualitative descriptive approach with secondary data analyzed through the interactive model of Miles and Huberman, the study compares humanitarian funding records, media coverage, and international advocacy for Sudan with those for Gaza and Ukraine. The analysis is framed by a postcolonial perspective, drawing on Spivak's concept of the subaltern and Finnemore's constructivist account of humanitarian intervention norms. The findings show that the 2025 Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan is severely underfunded, with only about 25 percent of the US\$4.2 billion requested secured while media coverage of Sudan is roughly 97 percent lower than coverage of Gaza and 92 percent lower than coverage of Ukraine despite a comparable or greater scale of suffering. The study concludes that this uneven response is not a failure of compassion or a coincidence, but the working of a global power structure still shaped by colonial logic, in which international norms determine who counts as "human" and worth defending, while Sudanese civilians are treated as subalterns whose voices are silenced in global forums.

Keywords: Sudan, Postcolonial, Geopolitical Selectivity, International Response

Introduction

In general, a humanitarian crisis can be defined as an event or series of events that pose a critical threat to the health, safety, security, or well-being of a community or large group of people, and usually occur over a wide area. This usually results in high mortality or malnutrition rates, the spread of disease and epidemics, and shortages of clean water, food, sanitation, and shelter. Humanitarian crises stem from a lack of protection in certain regions of the world that already suffer from inequality, poverty, and a lack of basic services, which are usually exacerbated by political events such as armed conflict, coups, ethnic and religious persecution, and natural disasters such as tsunamis, earthquakes, hurricanes, and others.

In the dynamics of contemporary international relations, humanitarian crises have become one of the main challenges that often test global solidarity, the legitimacy of multilateral institutions, and the commitment of countries to human rights principles. However, it is increasingly clear that not all crises receive equal treatment. Some conflicts immediately attract global attention, mobilize humanitarian aid, and prompt decisive political action. Meanwhile, other conflicts that are equally or even more destructive escape international attention, are marginalized in media discourse, and fail to elicit an adequate response

from the global community. In this context, the humanitarian crisis in Sudan presents a striking contrast that warrants in-depth study.

Since the outbreak of armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023, the country has once again been plunged into chaos. Major cities such as Khartoum, Nyala, and El Geneina have become battlefields, with civilians bearing the brunt of the violence. UNICEF reports that 15 million children are in need of assistance, up from 7.8 million at the beginning of 2023 (UN News, 2025). The impact has been devastating for Sudan's 51 million people. More than 61,000 people have been reported dead, while another 638,000 face severe famine. Nearly 13 million people have been displaced, with 4 million fleeing to neighboring countries (Central African Republic/CAR, Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, Libya, South Sudan, and Uganda). The UN refugee agency, UNHCR, described the situation in Sudan as “the world's largest and fastest-growing refugee crisis.” (UN News, 2025) A total of 24.6 million people do not have enough food, a number that is close to half of Sudan's population (The Guardian, 2025). The World Food Program states that the conflict in Sudan risks triggering the world's largest and worst famine. Famine has spread to five regions in Sudan and could spread to ten other regions in the coming months, with 17 other regions at risk (WFP, 2025).

According to UNICEF, the war in Sudan has exposed more than 12 million people to widespread sexual violence used to terrorize the entire population. There were 221 reported cases of child rape in 2024 across nine states, with 16 cases involving children under the age of five and four involving infants under the age of one (Al Jazeera, 2025). Despite this, the world's attention to Sudan is very limited. There is no firm embargo, no meaningful intervention, and international media coverage is sporadic.

In 2024, the UN needs \$2.7 billion in aid, but only 4% of the required funds have been secured, forcing the UN to tap into emergency reserves to help civilians meet their basic food and shelter needs in Sudan (The Advocate, 2024). This year, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called on the international community to immediately increase funding and diplomatic efforts to alleviate the suffering of millions of Sudanese people facing starvation and displacement, while at the same time, opposing military forces continue to fight each other for control. This statement refers to the UN Secretary-General's official statement delivered at a high-level humanitarian conference in the Ethiopian capital, Addis Ababa, in April 2025 (UN News, 2025). The UN is preparing to launch two major response plans for Sudan and its neighboring countries, which will require \$4.2 billion in funding, with an additional \$1.8 billion to support those hosting refugees in

neighboring countries (UN News, 2025). The United States was the largest single donor to Sudan last year, contributing US\$800 million, or about 46 percent of the funds for the UN response plan. However, the UN currently has less than 6 percent of the humanitarian funds needed for Sudan in 2025 (Detiknews, 2025).

Media commentators often refer to the conflict in Sudan as the “forgotten war” (VOA, 2024). This conflict has not been forgotten, but it has been ignored, and for the most part it has been ongoing since chaos erupted in 2023 (The Guardian, 2025). Sudan is one of the countries in East Africa with a land area three times larger than Ukraine and Gaza combined, and the death toll is estimated to be five times higher than in the devastated Palestinian territories. A 2024 British government press release included 470 mentions of Ukraine and only 60 mentions of Sudan. Throughout 2024, The New York Times published nearly 10 times more articles featuring Gaza than Sudan, and more than 13 times more about Ukraine (Byline Times, 2024).

Sudan is not considered politically or economically strategic by global powers, so attention and resources are directed more towards regions that have a direct impact on their interests. Therefore, large and influential countries prefer to devote resources to protecting their economies and influence abroad rather than fighting for human rights in regions of the world that are not important (The Advocate, 2024).

The international community's interest in responding to this major crisis appears to be limited, indicating that the scale of suffering is not the only indicator of response. Certain social, political, and identity dynamics cause the world to be more concerned about one conflict and ignore another. This phenomenon shows that there is moral and political selectivity in the international system, where attention to humanitarian crises is more influenced by narratives, identities, and geopolitical locations than by the scale of suffering.

The study reads the conflict through a postcolonial perspective, which examines how the colonial legacy still shapes power relations, identity, and discourse in the contemporary global order. Even after formal colonialism ended, former colonizers (the West) and former colonies (the Global South) remain locked in unequal relations. The unevenness of global responses and aid is not coincidental, but is part of a global power structure still governed by colonial logic

Drawing on *Can the Subaltern Speak?* (Spivak, 1988), the framework defines the subaltern as the most oppressed groups who lack access to political power, are unheard in dominant systems (academia, media, politics), are not fairly represented in global narratives, and have their voices ignored, reinterpreted by elites, or filtered by colonial and postcolonial institutions even when they do speak. Sudanese civilians are positioned as global subalterns as victims of the conflict with no

space in international forums, international media, or international institutions. They are forgotten, silenced, and treated as unimportant.

Constructing Norms of Humanitarian Intervention (Finnemore, 1996) shows that humanitarian intervention over the past 150 years has been shaped not only by geopolitical or economic interests, but by evolving international norms. However, those norms are selective about who counts as "human" and worth defending: Black Africans were not yet considered part of universal humanity, so treatment of them remains discriminatory. The international community's uneven response to Sudan is not a failure of compassion but the working of a colonial power structure, where norms decide who counts as human and the subaltern victims never get to speak

Methods

This study uses a qualitative descriptive data analysis approach. According to Bogdan and Taylor, as cited by Lexy, J. Moleong (2007), a qualitative approach is a research procedure that produces descriptive data in the form of written or spoken words from people and behaviors of interest. The type of research used is descriptive, which is a type of research that aims to describe systematically and factually the facts and characteristics of the object being studied. Qualitative descriptive research does not seek causal relationships or predictions, but rather emphasizes a deep understanding of “what happened,” “how,” and “why”

a phenomenon occurred in a particular social context, in this case related to existing theories in international relations.

There are two types of data in a study, namely quantitative data and qualitative data. According to Sugiyono (2017), quantitative data is data in the form of numbers that can be measured or calculated statistically. Meanwhile, qualitative data, according to Moleong, L. J. (2016), consists of descriptions, words, or narratives that describe the quality, nature, or character of an object. In this study, the data collected is mixed, consisting of qualitative data in the form of narratives and descriptions, and quantitative data in the form of numbers or statistics. The data was obtained to gain an in-depth understanding of the behavior, experiences, thoughts, and views of the research subjects regarding the phenomenon being studied.

Meanwhile, the type of data used is secondary data. Secondary data is data that is not obtained directly from interaction with the research subjects, but is obtained from documents, archives, literature, or other sources that are already available. Through the type of data related to the main substance of this study, the author will describe the international response to the war in Sudan.

This study also uses an interactive data analysis model developed by Miles and Huberman (1994). This model was chosen because it is able

to capture the data analysis process dynamically, is iterative (repeatable), and allows researchers to reflect deeply on the data during the research process. This analysis model consists of three main components that are interrelated and occur simultaneously: data collection, data reduction, data presentation, verification and drawing conclusions.


Findings and Discussion

The conflict in Sudan reached its 1000th day on January 9th 2026, with more than 20 million people in need of health care and 21 million people in urgent need of food. The war between the Sudanese military and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) paramilitary group erupted on April 15 2023, triggering a wave of violence that has led to one of the world’s fastest-growing humanitarian crises. Both sides have been accused of committing war crimes and crimes against humanity, while the RSF has been implicated in heinous crimes in Darfur that the UN says may constitute genocide.

According to the latest UN data, at least 21.2 million people face high levels of acute food insecurity, 9.5 million people are internally displaced, 4.35 million people have fled the country, and 10 million children are out of school because classrooms have been destroyed, occupied, or are unsafe to access. Women and girls face a higher risk,

with victims reporting mass executions, torture, rape, sexual abuse, and ransom demands by RSF forces.

Picture 1
The Dispersal of Refugees from Sudan



Source: IOM

According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM), Sudan is facing the world's largest humanitarian and displacement crisis, with more than 9.5 million people internally displaced across 10,929 locations in 185 areas, spanning all 18 of Sudan's states. Most of the displaced people have sought refuge in South Darfur (1.84 million),

North Darfur (1.75 million), and Central Darfur (978,000). More than half—51 percent—of those displaced are children.

In addition to the 9.5 million internally displaced people, an estimated 4.34 million have sought refuge in neighboring countries, bringing the total number of displaced people in Sudan to approximately 14 million—more than a quarter of the country’s population of 51 million. Most have sought refuge in Egypt (1.5 million), South Sudan (1.25 million), and Chad (1.2 million). Of those who fled, about 70 percent were Sudanese nationals, while 30 percent were non-Sudanese.


As of September 2025, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) estimates that 21.2 million people—or 45 percent of Sudan’s population—are facing high levels of acute food insecurity. This includes 6.3 million people in Phase 4, or emergency conditions, and 375,000 people experiencing Phase 5 famine. Famine is the most severe form of hunger, occurring when people face severe food shortages, widespread malnutrition, and high mortality rates due to starvation.

El-Fasher in North Darfur and the besieged city of Kadugli in South Kordofan have been classified as famine-stricken areas. Conditions in the nearby besieged city of Dilling are believed to be just as dire, with supply routes cut off and food shortages worsening by the day. The RSF captured the city of El-Fasher, the capital of North Darfur

state, in October following an 18-month campaign of siege and starvation. The city is the Sudanese army's last stronghold in the region. Those who fled el-Fasher—especially children—arrived in nearby towns such as Tawila in a state of severe malnutrition.

The war has devastated Sudan's public infrastructure, including its healthcare system. Less than 25 percent of hospitals are operational, leaving millions of people without access to medical care amid a surge in disease outbreaks. The World Health Organization (WHO) has documented 200 attacks on health facilities and medical personnel, with 20 ambulances severely damaged or destroyed. With extremely limited access to health care, cholera has spread throughout Sudan, resulting in more than 123,000 confirmed cases and more than 3,500 deaths.

Picture 2
Number of Destroyed Health Facilities in Sudan



Source: OCHA

According to the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), as many as 5,000 children have been forced to flee their homes every day since the conflict began in April 2023. “Many of them have been forced to flee not just once, but repeatedly, with violence continuing to follow them wherever they flee,” said UNICEF Spokesperson Ricardo Pires (UNICEF, 2026). He warned that millions of children—including infants—are also at risk of being raped. According to OCHA, approximately 12 million people—mostly women and girls—are at risk of gender-based violence. The global humanitarian funding crisis has impacted the work of the UN and its partners in Sudan, with only 36 percent of the \$4.2 billion requested last year ultimately funded by donors. Given this decline in financial support, OCHA plans to assist 20 million people out of the nearly 34 million

estimated to be in need of humanitarian assistance in Sudan in 2026. The plan is projected to require \$2.9 billion in funding.

Factors Triggering International Response to Humanitarian Crises

There are three factors regarding the allocation of funding in humanitarian crises, namely media influence, geopolitical interests, and humanitarian needs. However, the most consistent factor is media coverage. Countries with the worst human rights situations attract lower levels of funding, while more democratic countries attract higher levels of funding (Rost & Clarke, 2024).

1. The Influence of Media Coverage

The mediatization of bureaucracy focuses specifically on how the organizational structure and unique behavior of rule-based public organizations are affected when they adopt or adapt to media logic (as opposed to, for example, political logic) (Schillemans, 2012). In studies of bureaucratic mediatization, the influence of news media is understood to operate within complex and dynamic governance systems, involving interactions with various other accountability institutions, as well as diverse political, professional, and bureaucratic logics.

The concept of “media pressure” explains why government institutions may act in accordance with media logic (Schillemans, 2012). According to the “media pressure” hypothesis, “government institutions that are more frequently monitored, covered, and criticized by the media can be expected to have a stronger incentive to conform to the media” (Fredriksson, Schillemans, & Pallas 2015). The

assumption, as explained by Jacobs and Schillemans (2016), is that by reporting on bureaucracy, “the media can trigger accountability because the perceived negative risks trigger anticipatory reactions in public organizations.”

2. Geopolitical Interests

Studies have found that geopolitics influences aid allocation. Alesina and Dollar (2000) report that aid is positively correlated with alignment in UN voting and the number of years a recipient country was colonized, suggesting that donors provide aid to maintain alliances. The pattern of donors providing more aid to their former colonies has been repeatedly documented in various contexts. For example, Weiler et al (2018) found that donors prefer their former colonies when allocating aid for climate change adaptation. Aid also appears to support security interests: total aid disbursements were positively related to the military spending of Warsaw Pact countries during the Cold War, but not afterwards (Boschini & Olofsgård, 2007). Similarly, military intervention by members of the OECD (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development)/DAC (Development Assistance Committee) has a significant impact on aid allocation. Aid flows from these donors increase significantly when at least one donor sends troops to support the target government, and decrease after those troops are withdrawn (Kisangani & Pickering, 2015). Analysis of dyadic panel data shows that all major donors provide more aid to countries that vote the

same way as they do in the UN General Assembly (Hoeffler & Outram, 2011).

3. Humanitarian Aid Needs

Constructivist research emphasizes that the decision to intervene depends on the level of crisis. Intervention occurs when the level of human suffering is high, and the moral pressure to act on behalf of the victims of the crisis becomes significant (Hasenclever, 2001). In the same context, it has been argued that mass human suffering is a condition (but not a sufficient condition) for intervention (Jakobsen, 1996).

To deliver aid to disaster areas, decision makers need to be aware of various problem areas. Examples of problem areas include facility location, inventory management, and transportation. These problem areas relate to decisions such as where to locate facilities and how to access them, where to place temporary facilities, how to organize supply networks to deliver relief goods from various facilities, how to transport these goods to the intended disaster areas, and finally, how to distribute them to the affected communities (Howden, 2009; Thomas & Mizushima, 2005).

International Responses

International involvement in Sudan has predominantly focused on humanitarian aid, often neglecting the political dimensions that are

essential for promoting sustainable peace (Harrison, 2023). Various institutions, including the United Nations and a number of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), have provided critical support in response to urgent humanitarian needs. This involvement is vital in saving lives and providing emergency assistance. However, this approach is not without its flaws; there are allegations that humanitarian support is being exploited by local actors for political gain, further complicating the dynamics on the ground (Kibera, 2022). Such exploitation often undermines genuine humanitarian efforts and can inadvertently reinforce existing power structures rather than challenge them. While the non-political nature of international intervention allows for immediate assistance in the midst of severe humanitarian crises, it can also lead to significant mismatches with local realities and socio-political contexts (Hassan, 2023). Without sufficient political engagement, conflicts may remain unresolved, and humanitarian efforts may fail to address root causes such as governance failures, social injustices, and economic inequalities that fuel ongoing violence (Asad, 2023). The absence of a strategic political framework in humanitarian aid limits the potential for building a more comprehensive and sustainable peace, leaving these communities without the tools necessary to navigate their political landscape effectively.

In addition, geopolitical influences complicate the international community's response to the crisis. Major countries may prioritize their strategic interests over the urgent humanitarian needs of the Sudanese people. This can lead to fragmented support, where conflicting narratives dominate, often exacerbating rather than easing existing tensions (Tageldin, 2023). For example, while some countries may link their humanitarian aid to political reform, others may use aid as a tool to gain access to resources or expand their political influence, thereby complicating the discourse surrounding effective humanitarian action.

In addition to these challenges, the presence of various humanitarian actors in Sudan often causes significant coordination difficulties. Many organizations working in similar sectors can inadvertently create competition for limited resources and visibility, thereby weakening the overall impact of relief efforts (Ibrahim, 2023). Instead of combining their efforts for a coordinated and comprehensive response, this fragmented approach can undermine the effectiveness of campaigns aimed at providing assistance. The lack of cohesion among humanitarian actors can also complicate relationships with the government and local communities, thereby reducing the effectiveness of engagement in the local context. Furthermore, this fragmented operational framework can pose additional challenges for agencies

seeking to navigate the complexities of Sudan's local dynamics without a unified strategy or adequate political support (Lindsey, 2022).

In addition, the absence of an integrated political strategy in international aid can threaten the long-term sustainability of humanitarian efforts. Aid that focuses solely on meeting immediate needs often neglects the institutional capacity needed to promote sustainable development and good governance, which are essential for addressing the root causes of conflict (Khan, 2023). As a result, by failing to incorporate political engagement into their efforts, international actors risk perpetuating a cycle of dependency in which communities rely excessively on external aid rather than being empowered to build their own local capacity. This situation can hinder peace and reconciliation efforts, as communities may view international actors solely as providers of temporary support, without a committed investment in the long-term stability of the region (Nyaboga, 2022).

1. Inequality in Global Humanitarian Aid

The Advocacy Manager of the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) in Sudan, Mathilde Vu, emphasized the alarming hunger crisis, in which more than half of the population is experiencing dangerous levels of hunger, while refugees in neighboring countries struggle to eat every day. “When it's not bullets, it's hunger that kills,” said Mathilde Wu after

describing nearly two years of war as “months of relentless violence and a worsening humanitarian crisis.” (Høvring, 2024). According to the International Rescue Committee (IRC), Sudan tops the list of countries experiencing humanitarian crises, with 30.4 million people in need of humanitarian assistance (IRC, 2025).

Table 1
**Humanitarian Funding Report 2023-2025 Between Sudan,
Gaza, and Ukraine**

Coordinated plan	Funded (US\$M)	Required (US\$M)	% Coverage
Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan 2023	1,307.3	2,565.2	51.00%
Escalation of Hostilities in the OPT Flash Appeal 2023	634.7	629.1	100.90%
Occupied Palestinian Territory Humanitarian Response Plan 2023	371.5	376.7	98.60%
Ukraine Humanitarian Response Plan 2023	2,914.3	3,945.7	73.90%
Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024	1,898.2	2,695.7	70.40%
Escalation of Hostilities in the OPT Flash Appeal 2024	2,873.4	3,422.9	83.90%
Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2024	2,393.2	3,107.7	77.00%
Sudan Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025	1,484.7	4,162.5	35.70%
Escalation of Hostilities in the OPT Flash Appeal 2025	1,626.1	4,073.1	39.90%
Ukraine Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2025	1,286.6	2,633.5	48.90%

Source: Financial Tracking Service OCHA 2025

The humanitarian response in Sudan has reached more than 13.5 million people this year. However, funding shortfalls are making it increasingly difficult for the UN and its partners to deliver adequate assistance. With a total of US\$4.2 billion, the 2025 Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan remains severely underfunded, with only 25 percent of the funds secured (UN, 2025).

FTS publishes all humanitarian funding reports for affected countries. The data presented includes funding for internationally coordinated response plans in the country, as well as funding outside the requirements of the plan (such as Red Cross activities and bilateral funding to the affected country's government).

2. Media Coverage and Global Public Response

Based on the number of high-level political statements, international media coverage, and the amount of funds raised through UN humanitarian appeals, the war in Sudan appears to be receiving less attention than the two major conflicts currently underway: Ukraine and Gaza. Over the past 12 months, for example, the German Chancellor's Office mentioned Ukraine in 190 press releases and Sudan only three times. During the same period, The New York Times published nearly 10 times more articles mentioning Gaza than those highlighting Sudan, and more than 13 times more than articles mentioning Ukraine. And

while the UN Emergency Appeal for the Occupied Palestinian Territory has been funded at 104 percent, the 2024 appeal for Sudan has been funded at less than 6 percent, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (before the Paris conference announced an additional commitment of US\$2 billion on April 15).

Picture 3

Comparison of Daily Article Counts between Sudan, Gaza, and
Ukraine



Source: NYT, BBC, CNN, The Guardian, Reuters, AP, etc

The Sudan crisis, despite its enormous scale, receives relatively less media attention than Gaza or Ukraine. When Sudan is in the news spotlight, media coverage often focuses on political instability, the impact on civilians, and human casualties resulting from the conflict, but tends to lack sustained coverage. This is in contrast to the Gaza crisis, especially during major escalations such as the Hamas attacks on

Israel in October 2023 and Israel's military response in Gaza. Major media outlets such as the BBC, Al Jazeera, CNN, and others provided regular updates, sometimes hourly, during the escalation, creating a continuous stream of the latest information. Meanwhile, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 triggered rapid and extensive media coverage in Western, Eastern, and international media. Ukraine's fate remained a major topic in global media during the 2023-2025 period, mainly because this conflict continued to dominate international headlines.

Picture 4

A Comparison of Casualty Figures and Media Coverage in
Sudan, Gaza, and Ukraine




Source: NYT, BBC, CNN, The Guardian, Reuters, AP, etc.

The conflict in Sudan has one of the highest death tolls among currently ongoing wars, with 11 million people forced to flee—more than the combined number of refugees from Ukraine and Gaza. However, media coverage of this conflict is about 97% less than that of Gaza and

92% less than that of Ukraine. This war involved genocide, mass displacement, and documented international involvement—yet it remained invisible to Western audiences.

Graph 1

A Comparison of Trends Related to the Sudanese Civil War, the Gaza Conflict, and the War in Ukraine on Google Search



Source: Google Trends 2026

International advocacy for Sudan is not as popular as advocacy for Gaza or Ukraine. Although organizations such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the United Nations have launched campaigns and reports, these efforts often fail to attract sustained global attention. Sudan also lacks celebrity-driven campaigns or high-profile activism seen in other crises, such as Gaza.

Celebrities and influencers from around the world, including Leonardo DiCaprio, Stephen King, and Mila Kunis, have used their platforms to support Ukraine. Public figures often donate to organizations or participate in fundraising events, using social media to amplify these efforts (Independent, 2022; Euronews, 2022).

Conclucion

Based on the data summarized by the author in the previous chapters, it can be concluded that the international response to Sudan is much smaller due to: only about 25% of the US\$4.2 billion US humanitarian plan for 2025 has been funded, leaving most life-saving programs underfunded. Media coverage and global advocacy for Sudan lag far behind other crises, with analysts noting that “media attention and advocacy for Sudan lag far behind Gaza and Ukraine,” limiting public awareness and donor pressure. Competing geopolitical interests among external powers fracture aid coordination, leading to duplication and inefficiencies that further reduce the amount of aid actually delivered. The absence of an integrated political framework hinders coordinated aid mobilization, while Sudan's marginalization in global discourse reduces donor commitment to sustainability. Together, these factors—inadequate funding, low visibility, and fragmented geopolitics—explain why Sudan receives far fewer international resources than other humanitarian crises such as Gaza or Ukraine.

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Declaration of Conflict Interest

The Authors declare that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this article.