

Uncover the Indonesia Middlepowermanship: When Indonesia find the Middle Power Moment?

Frequency of International Relations
September, Vol 5 (1) 23-50
© The Author(s)
fetrian.fisip.unand.ac.id
Submission track :
Submitted : April 15, 2023
Accepted : May 16, 2023
Available On-line : June 14, 2023

Bima Jon Nanda

Department Asia Pacific and Regional Studies,
National Dong Hwa University
81110B008@gms.ndhu.edu.tw

Abstract

Indonesia is middle power state. But no state can be a middle power all the time. There is middle power moment which allows ones to pursue its middle powerdom. Indonesia already identified as middle power states, in the aspect of economic, geographical, behaviour, and identity aspect. But what when is Indonesisa middle power moment? What is Indonesia middlepowermanship? This article aim to explain Indonesia middlepowermanship and its middle power moment. This article applies a data-driven, qualitative approach using secondary data. This article argues that Indonesia middlepowermanship is Indonesia's persistent effort to build a rules-based regional order in Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific using ASEAN and Bali Democracy Forum. This rule based order is based on democracy, and human rights. While Indonesia middle power moment started as early of 2003, when Indonesia take the role as ASEAN chairmanship that lead into Bali Concord II and ASEAN Charted 2008. This is the moment Indonesia cemented its position as middle power and gain the middle power momentum.

Keywords: Indonesia; Middle Power; ASEAN; Bali Democracy Forum; Middlepowerdom

Introduction

Middle Power is a term that emerge from Organski's IR theory which propagate four-tier international hierarchy of dominant powers (commonly called as superpower now), great powers, middle powers, and small powers (Cooper, 2011, 318) . While many of middle power scholar recently simplified the categories just into three (great, middle, and small powers). Middle power is defined as term for states that are not major global players, but still can play consequential role regionally and influence some degree of global affairs (Cooper, 2011, 319).

In sense, middle power are states that do not reach the capabilities and power of great powers, but they still have more power and capabilities to influence compare to small states. The middle power can be identified by its foreign policy behaviour (Cooper Andrew F. et al., 1993) , Its foreign policy commonly involves like-minded countries via multilateral meetings and organizations (Jordaan, 2003).

Many scholars argue that Indonesia are indeed a middle power states (Azra, 2015; Grzywacz & Gawrycki, 2021; G. Thies & C. Sari, 2018; Iksan & Soong, 2022; Teo, 2022). According to Abbondanza, there are four main reasons why Indonesia is crowned as a middle power state; its material capabilities, its ambition, its foreign policies that either side with great power rivalries in Asia Pacific (United States

and China) and this binary choice could label Indonesia as a sceptic middle power, and its leadership in ASEAN (Abbondanza, 2022, 414-415). Beeson and Lee argue that Indonesia “has not only begun to act like a middle power in playing a more prominent part in various multilateral organizations, but has also begun to use the language of middlepowerdom is especially significant.”(Beeson & Lee, 2015, 230).

If we agree Indonesia are indeed middle power states, then it raise two important questions. First, what are Indonesia middlepowermanship? The concept of middlepowermanship, was first used by John W. Holmes and Paul Painchaud at 1965. middlepowermanship essentially are capabilities that do not signal intent to dominate but sufficient to contribute to global governance (Shin, 2016, 208) . This are generally understood as middle power diplomacy that derived from this status and role. According Cox, “middle-power role is not a fixed universal but something that has to be rethought continually in the context of the changing state of the international system” (Cox, 1989, 825). In sense, no state can be middle power all the time, there are middle power moment which allows ones to pursue its middlepowerdom.

Second, if Indonesia are middle power states, then what are its middle power moment that define it as middle power states? If we look at Hynek work (Hynek, 2004) there are three predominant models

used in the study of middle powers. First, are the 'hierarchical model', where middle power is assessed on the basis of quantifiable attributes such as area, population, size, complexity, and strength of economy, military, and comparable factor. The foremost propagator of this model is David Mitrany, where international community divided into two rank of states, small and great power, where small can become middle powers (Hynek, 2004, 35) . Second are the behavioural model where middle power driven by role conception resting on notion of good international citizenship, multilateralism, coalition building and mediation. (Hynek, 2004, 36). Third, the functional model that can be associated with "niche diplomacy", where states concentrate resources in the specific areas that offers the best returns (Hynek, 2004, 38).

This article then aims to answer and explain the emerging questions when Indonesia is labelled as middle power states. This article argues that middlepowermanship of Indonesia is behavioural pattern of Indonesia's persistent effort to build a rules-based regional order in Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific using ASEAN and BDF. Then the Middle power moment of Indonesia that opened its opportunity to pursue middlepowerdom come when Indonesia become the leader of ASEAN in 2003 and push the acceptance of democracy as ASEAN lexicon which also extended into the function of BDF in broader Indo-Pacific region. To substitute this argument, this article will assess Indonesia middlepowermanship based on three approach of

middle power. Using the 'three chronological waves of middlepowerdom' from Cooper and Dal (A. F. Cooper & Parlar Dal, 2016) to capture the moment Indonesia middlepowerdom. This article then using qualitative approach. This research mainly using the secondary data's sources are Books, journal articles, newspapers, reports and online media related to keyword "Indonesia," "Indonesia Middle Power," "Middlepowerdom," "Middlepowermanship." Once compiled, the data is analysed using the middle power approach and middlepowerdom waves mentioned above.

This article structure divided into four parts. The introduction, the second part will mainly discuss the theoretical and conceptual framework of middlepowermanship and middlepowerdom. While the third part are explanation of Indonesia middlepowermanship and its middle power moment. The last part is conclusion of this article.

Middlepowermanship and Middlepowerdom

What is the Middle Power?

Interestingly, there are no authoritative academic works specifically focused on the definition of middle powers (Robertson, 2017, 360). However, to understand the concept of middle power, one must understand the basic understanding of what constitutes the middle power is. For starter, middle power is a state (Adam Chapnick, 1999, 73). With this basic premise, middle power is state centric approach of

international community. This eliminate the possibility of other actor (for example the non-state actor) to enter the middlepowerdom. While the word “middle” meaning that the state that identified or claim as middle power positioned its power between great and small.

A middle power in the most basic form, is a state that neither great or small (Adam Chapnick, 1999). According to Mark Beeson and Richard Higgott (Beeson & Higgott, 2014, 223) traditional understanding of the middle-power concept can be divided into three definitional categories, which is: (i) middling in terms of their location (between Great Powers), (ii) size (on a scale between big and small states) or (iii) ‘middleness’ (adopting a middling ideological position between two polarized ideological positions or political systems). While Frederic Soward (Soward, 1963) also points three type of definition. First category relates into their material capacity, second is using functionalism to distinguish category of middle powers, and third category relate to the nature of middle power diplomacy, the strategic of ‘know how’ in key diplomatic areas with like minded countries. While according to Robert (Robertson, 2017, 361) Three leading scholars of the post-Cold War revival school, Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgott and Kim Nossal, categorise middle power definitions into positional, geographic, normative and behavioural. While Carr (Carr, 2014, 71) define middle power with three approaches: position, behaviour and identity.

Furthermore, Jordaan explained that middle power “are states that are neither great nor small in terms of international power, capacity and influence, and demonstrate a propensity to promote cohesion and stability in the world system” (Jordaan, 2003, 165). One of the important arguments from Jordaan is classification between traditional and emerging middle power. Traditional middle power are wealthy, stable, egalitarian, social democratic and not regionally influential. While the emerging middle power by contrast are semi-peripheral, materially inegalitarian and recently democratised states that demonstrate much regional influence and self-association (Jordaan, 2003) . Another important characteristic to distinguish between traditional and emerging are the international identity construction. Traditional middle power distance from powerful in region while emerging distance from weak in the region (Jordaan, 2003, 169).

Middlepowermanship of middle power states

Cooper, Higgot and Nossal (A. F. Cooper et al., 1993) define middle power based on positional, geographic, normative and behavioural. Positional is most common approach to define middle power by its position in international hierarchy, which Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal explain that “middle powers are said to be those states occupying the 'middle' point in a range of bigness to smallness - usually

measured by reference to such quantifiable attributes as area, population, size, complexity and strength of economy, military capability, and other comparable factors (A. F. Cooper et al., 1993, 17). While Carr explain 'position' is middle power quantifiable factors, such as gross domestic product (GDP), population, military size and defence spending (Carr, 2014, 71). Position means that middle power is defined based on their material capabilities. While the position approach is relatively easy to develop, but also seems useless to predict the behaviour of middle power states (Ravenhill, 1998; Stairs, 1998) . Position approach is clearly flaw, because it could give us the analytical certainty but cannot tell us what its mean. In Carr word (Carr, 2014, 72) "It swaps what we can count for what we want to know."

The other approach is 'geographic.' 'Geographic relates to state as in between a system's major power (Robertson, 2017, 461). Cooper, Higgot, and Nossal argue that there are two variants of geographical approach, their power distinguishes them within their region, occupy a 'middle' position, ideologically, between polarized great powers that common in the Cold War period (A. F. Cooper et al., 1993, 17). While Carr (Carr, 2014, 73) see geography as variation approach of 'position'. Furthermore, Carr explain there are three types of geographic indicators to claim middle power status, which is: geographic size (landmass), geographic position that separated two great powers and could contribute to the defence of either power, and the proximity of

power projection (Carr, 2014, 73). But again, geographical approach it is not an absolute guide, depending on the location and size of nearby countries (Cox, 1989).

The third approach that Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal argue are 'normative. view. Middle power "are seen as potentially wiser or more virtuous than states positioned either 'above' them (the great powers) or 'below' them (minor power)." (A. F. Cooper et al., 1993, 18) Robert (Robertson, 2017, 361) elaborate it as "states which pursue 'honest broker' practices, such as mediation and facilitation, reflecting their ability to act on the global stage but at the same time their inability to exert hegemonic influence". Cooper, Higgott and Nossal argue in support of an alternative definition beside normative approach, because the middle power diplomatic activity is best captured that later become distinct category, by focusing of not what this group of countries will do, but what diplomatic behaviour that they will display in common (A. F. Cooper et al., 1993, 19). Robert (Robertson, 2017, 361) summarize behaviour approach as "the pursuit of multilateral solutions to international problems, compromise in international disputes, and 'good international citizenship'".

Behaviour approach are the alternative definition against the criticism of 'positional' approach. Behavioural approach become one popular to identifying middle power states (Flemes, 2007, 8) . Carr

(Carr, 2014, 73) argue that behaviour model focused on how middle power act, or in short, how middle power behave in multilateral engagement. Although this approach is popular and widely used, the approach still problematic. Hynek (Hynek, 2004, 37) argue that “every country can thus "behave" as a middle power regardless of its own capabilities.” Nevertheless, this approach suggest that a country could act in more important manner despite their country capabilities. That actually fit into middle power assumption as a state that belong in the ‘middle’. They do not have capabilities like great power, but they can do more because they are not small states.

While not as popular as behavioural approach, there exist another approach of middle power, which is identity approach. Middle power is best understood as a deliberately constructed ‘political category’ (Carr, 2014, 75-76) . This approach sees the middle power through the claims of policy makers when they assert middle power status for their country (Beeson, 2011, 540) . This identity approach resonates with Robert Keohane work (Keohane, 1969, 295) “instead of focusing on perceptions of whether security can be maintained primarily with one's own resources we should focus on the systemic role that states' leaders see their countries playing.” How state perceive itself is important to identify which countries are middle power. This approach could be noted from Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001, 399) argument

“knowing about a state’s perception of its identity (both type and role) should help us to understand how the state will act.” But Carr also criticize this approach, if the claim of policy maker become the basis of how we identify middle powers, then micro-nations in South Pacific could claim they are middle power status on par with Canada (Carr, 2014, 76).

Middlepowerdom and Middle Power Wave

The literature of middle power agreed on dynamism of the concept as well fluidity which states enter and exit the middlepowerdom of international hierarchy (Walton & Wilkins, 2019). As noted by Cox (Cox, 1989, 825) that middle power category is not fixed and universal, depending on the changing state of the international system. No state is in the position of middle in middlepowerdom. There is the middle power moment where state assert its middlepowermanship to achieve the status of middle power. Then Andrew Cooper and Emer Dal identify three chronological waves of middlepowerdom (A. F. Cooper & Parlar Dal, 2016) . The first wave, originated in the post-1945 era, when secondary power like Canada and Australia alongside couple of Western European states attempted to upgrade position based on functional logic (Walton & Wilkins, 2019, 4). Cooper and Dal argue that the first wave of middlepowerdom associated with mediation, peacekeeping, performance role in United

Nation and other formal organization (A. F. Cooper & Parlar Dal, 2016, 517).

The second wave of middlepowerdom occurred after the post-Cold War period (Walton & Wilkins, 2019, 4). Cooper and Dal argue that “using the space available in the post-Cold War period, a refined cluster of middle powers upgraded the intensity of their ideational and entrepreneurial roles.” (A. F. Cooper & Parlar Dal, 2016, 518) This wave is the heyday of ‘niche diplomacy’ of middle power, and the rise of emerging middle power joined the traditional middle power.

The third wave, or the current wave of middlepowerdom, is quite different and radically reshuffled category of middle power states into more complex make-up middlepowerdom (Walton & Wilkins, 2019, 5) . The third wave prompted by the 2008 financial crisis, when the decline of United States opening up structural change. Opened up advantage of middle powers that leads into change of ‘pyramid’ model of decision making in international organization, where a small ‘club’ of IMF’s Executive Board or the GATT’s making decision among themselves first and impose them to the rest no longer relevant (A. F. Cooper & Parlar Dal, 2016, 521) . Cooper and Dal argue “The third wave defines middle powers more explicitly by their inclusion in the G20.” (A. F. Cooper & Parlar Dal, 2016, 518) Furthermore, Cooper and Dal noted that in third wave of middlepowerdom marked for the first time, middle

powers have been brought to the 'high table' with equivalency of bigger states (A. F. Cooper & Parlar Dal, 2016, 522)

Indonesia Middlepowermanship and Middle Power Moment

Assesing Indonesia middlepowermanship

Indonesia is well known to be identified as middle power states. While Indonesia middlepowermanship can create robust debate, this article will asses Indonesia middlepowermanship based on its position, geographical, behavior, and identity. Because this article also aims to uncover Indonesia middle power moment to pursue its middle powerdom, then explaining Indonesia middlepowermanship is the important first step.

Position approach are material capabilities approach. The quantative nature of 'position' approach make middle power assessment quite 'easy'. While its not necessary must in the 'middle' of the list (for example, in the rank of 80-90 in military power among 193 states rocnognised by United Nations). Carr argue that middle power expected "to be found within the first 20 states when ranked on significant quantitative measures" (Carr, 2014) . Based on Lowy Institute Asia Power Index 2023 (Patton et al., 2023) that asses Asian country based on its resources (economic capability, military capability, resilience, future resources) and influences (cultural, diplomatic, defence networks, and economic resource), Indonesia is classified as

middle power, ranked 9 among 26 comprehensive power in Asia. Because 'position' approach considers material capabilities to assess middle powers, Indonesia indeed a middle power state. Indonesia is the largest country in Southeast Asia in terms of both economic size and population. In military aspect, Indonesia ranked 11th in defence spending and the estimated military spending in 2022 is 10.1 billion Dollar. Indonesia ranked 12th in armed forces power in Asia. Indonesia perform really well resource security, geopolitical security, and military posture (Lowy Institute, 2023).

While economic, military, resource and geopolitical security of Indonesia is quite impressive and indeed signalled that Indonesia are middle power, the position approach is indeed unsatisfied. The quantitative data is good to identified middle state but has no value predicting middle power behaviour base. This could be seen in Indonesia behaviour regarding the 'China threat' in South China Sea. Despite all concern of regional stability, Indonesia neither projecting its power capabilities or building coalition addressing China's growing power (Sulaiman, 2019) . It is hard and sometimes lead into misconception assessing Indonesia middlepowermanship using 'position' approach.

The geographic approach is indicating Indonesia is indeed a middle power. Indonesia based on the geographic size as an indicator of

power, clearly identifies as middle power. Based on the CIA World Factbook 2021 (Central Intelligence Agency, 2021) Indonesia ranked 15th (if Antarctica is excluded from the list) largest state by area. While Indonesia geographically do not separate two great powers, but Indonesia are the important player in the growing Sino-American rivalry. Indonesia located strategically in Indo-Pacific, as state sandwiched between Pacific and Indian Ocean. Indonesia in the recent years had played strategic role in maintaining strategic role in maintaining regional stability in Indo-Pacific despite the tension between United States and China (Mubah, 2019). While is not always result in conflict, but the heightened tension between Sino-American especially in Indo-Pacific region is generally understood as great power rivalry (Hu, 2020; Scobell, 2021) . In the literature that discussed Indonesia strategy as middle power while facing great power competition in the region usually also explain that Indonesia utilize the hedging strategy (Anwar, 2023; Kuik, 2022; Mubah, 2019; Yoshimatsu, 2022).

While Indonesia bear strategic importance because of their location, Indonesia middlepowermanship could be its geographical. Indonesia geopolitic strategy in the growing tension of great power rivalry in Indo-Pacific. David Scott (Scott, 2019, 196) argue “Indonesia’s position reflects what Indonesians call their own “cross-road location” (posisi silang). Geographically, Indonesia acts as a

“strategic funnel” (corong strategis) between the Indo and Pacific components of the Indo-Pacific”. This reflected in President Joko Widodo Global Maritime Fulcrum or ‘poros maritim dunia’ as approach in contributing Indo-Pacific region stability (Aufiya, 2017) . For Indonesia its geographical position is important in the growing great power rivalry in Indo-Pacific, this signaled Indonesia could exercise its middlepowermanship using middle power diplomacy between United States and China.

Indonesia middlepowermanship become crystal clear in behavioural approach. Indonesia act as “great power broker” to minimize the risk that caused by Sino-American rivalry that could bring instability to Indo-Pacific region. Indonesia in 2022 hosted the 17th G-20 meeting in Bali, Indonesia. In this meeting the two great powers, United States and China, lowering its rivalry tension and discuss various sensitive matters that become the source of its rivalry. President Xi Jinping and President Joe Biden having in-depth exchange of views, ranging from the two great powers commitment to respect each other about the existing international order, Taiwan issues, democracy, and even the prospect of cooperation and work together to move forward (People’s Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022). Indonesia not only succeed hosting G-20 meeting amidst the increasing geopolitical tension caused by Russia-Ukraine War, COVID-19, but Indonesia presidency in G20 bring

United States and China in the same multilateral meeting with after the trade war tension. Indonesia act as power broker is motivated not only because “free and active” of Indonesia foreign policy, but also pushed by Indonesia strategy as middle power to assert its influence in multilateral meeting while lowering the Sino-American rivalry tension to create stability in Indo-Pacific region.

Middle power tends to pursue multilateralism as reflection of middle power option, they not weak like small states, and seen more virtuous and wiser than superpowers or lesser powers (Laatikainen, 2006) . Indonesia pursue influence in multilateral organisation likes ASEAN and even created “made in Indonesia” multilateral forum with Indo-Pacific scope, the Bali Democracy Forum (BDF). Indonesia activism in multilateral forum to pursue multilateral solutions and embrace the notion of good international citizenship, shown Indonesia persistent effort to build a rules-based regional order in Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific using ASEAN and BDF. Indonesia pushing democracy values in Southeast Asia regionas notion of good international citizenship. While this will be quite contrary, remembering many of Southeast Asian nation that become member of ASEAN are considered undemocratic, Indonesia does not approach its democracy promotion with Western-style liberal-democracy but rather allows every country to choose home grown democracy (Rosyidin, 2020, 312). This home-grown democracy that becomes the basis of Indonesia

democracy framing is clearly resonate with Asian style democracy that emphasizes Asian values. Asian style democracy or in the Hood argument called “soft authoritarianism” originated more than three decades ago (Hood, 1998, 853) that perceives Asia as a different place from the West that has unique culture and conditions.

Indonesia also pushed ASEAN to establish the ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) (Acharya, 2014, 58). The establishment of the AICHR shows Indonesia's efforts to push democracy norms and human rights. Based on Indonesia Foreign Minister Natalegawa, democracy and human rights have become a part of ASEAN lexicon” (Acharya, 2014, 58) . In addition, Indonesia created other multilateral platforms to promote the democracy norm, such as the Bali Democracy Forum and its first meeting in 2008. The Bali Democracy Forum was initiated by Indonesia in 2008 as an open intergovernmental forum for the development of democracy in the Southeast Asia and Asia Pacific regions, and later become more broader into Indo-Pacific.

The identity approach maybe the weakest approach to analyze the middlepowermanship of middle power states. Because every country could claim they are middle power based on their policy maker statements. Nevertheless, its still the easiest approach to identify middle power states. Mark Beeson and Richard Higgot (Beeson &

Higgott, 2014, 216) argue that Indonesia are middle power based on their foreign policy language. In fact, Indonesia explicitly mention middle power diplomacy to increase Indonesia role as regional power (Yazid, 2023) . Based on Santo Darmosumarto, an advisor of international relations to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, argue Indonesia conception itself as a middle power (Beeson & Lee, 2015, 230) . Indeed, from Indonesia identity that perceive itself as middle power, it can be concluded that Indonesia is middle power. Indonesia approach of middlepowermanship that highlighted middle power diplomacy in regional that emphasize multilateralism, indicated that Indonesia exercise its middlepowermanship through regional institution such as ASEAN and BDF. Indonesia approach to Indo-Pacific dynamic using multilateralism platform of G20 to lowering Sino-american tension, emphasize Indonesia middlepowermanship could be seen in its behavior. Then it could be argued that Indonesia middlepowermanship are its persistence effort to push regional based order that build in homegrown democracy values in ASEAN and BDF.

Indonesia Middle Power Moment in Middlepowerdom

Indonesia middlepowermanship are its persistence in multilateralism organization, identified from geographical and identity approach. This become path to find Indonesia middle power moment. Based on geography approach, Indonesia find its middle power moment

when its join G20. Indonesia become emerging middle power that join in the third wave of middlepowerdom. But this is true if Indonesia middle power moment is located in the last decade. Indonesia middlepowermanship lies strongly in its effort to create regional based order in ASEAN and BDF.

Then, Indonesia middle power moment actually start early, in the second wave of middlepowerdom. Under President Yudhoyono, Indonesia has stepped up its presence in the global arena and aims to express its greater role in democracy promotion (Karim, 2017, 385). Indonesia's foreign policy has become more focused on promoting democracy (Rüland, 2017).

Democracy promotion is a way for Indonesia, a middle power, to "punch above its weight" through its influence, notably in Southeast Asia through ASEAN and in the broader region through the Bali Democracy Forum. Indonesia pursue of middlepowerdom began as early as 2003, under foreign minister Hasan Wirajuda. He proposed the ASEAN Security Community (ASC) in June 2003, which was later renamed ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) (Karim, 2017, 344). In Hasan Wirajuda's words, ASC is designed as a community that aims to promote democracy, human rights, and good governance (Wirajuda, 2012, 8). Indonesia middlepowermanship to establish rule-based order in ASEAN could be seen at Indonesia chairmanship of

ASEAN in 2003. During this time and the effort of Indonesia that democracy and human rights became a central part of ASEAN's agenda (Wirajuda, 2012, 8) During Indonesia chairmanship in ASEAN that lead into Bali Concord II (ASEAN, 2003). Bali Concord II contains ideas on how democracy and human rights are accepted by all ASEAN members (Rosyidin, 2020, 322) . Bali Concord II becomes the institutional basis of ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), ASEAN Security Community (ASC), ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC). In the Bali Concord it is stated that ASC will ensure “that countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world at large in a just, democratic and harmonious environment” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2012).

The rule based based order of become stronger in ASEAN Charter 2008, that reinforced the promotion of human rights and democracy in ASEAN (Wirajuda, 2012). This hown in one of the main purposes and principles of ASEAN Charter 2008 “To strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms, with due regard to the rights and responsibilities of the member states of ASEAN” (Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 2007) . The ASEAN charter can be traced back to Bali Concord II and Indonesia's role in promoting democratic values in 2003. Therefore, Indonesia middle power moment truly begin after the fall of President Soeharto regime

in 1998, that ignite Indonesia effort to back in the game and push the rule-based order in Southeast Asia region using ASEAN. The creation of BDF emphasize the expansion of Indonesia effort to broader its middlepowermanship into Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

No state can be a middle power all the time. There is middle power moment which allows ones to pursue its middlepowerdom. In the case of Indonesia, democracy is not the value that makes its middlepowermanship come true or matter. Yet, it is Indonesia's persistent effort to build a rules-based regional order in Southeast Asia and the broader Indo-Pacific using ASEAN and BDF. Democracy promotion is leverage tools that Indonesia use to gain middlepowermanship. Despite regression of democracy index in Indonesia, it remain eager to continue the Bali Democracy Forum and emphasize democracy values in ASEAN. Indonesia promoting the homegrown democracy is to gain influence and signaling good international citizenship. Although Indonesia effort promoting democracy norm could shown Indonesia persistent effort to its foreign policies goal (as homegrown democracy norm entrepreneur), this article conclude that Indonesia middlepowermanship heavily located in its middle power diplomacy in ASEAN and BDF, while its middlepower moment in middlepowerdom started as early of 2003, when Indonesia

take the role as ASEAN chairmanship that lead into Bali Concord II and ASEAN Charted 2008.

Reference

- Abbondanza, G. (2022). Whither the Indo-Pacific? Middle power strategies from Australia, South Korea and Indonesia. *International Affairs*, 98(2), 403–421. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiab231>
- Acharya, A. (2014). *Indonesia Matters: Asia's Emerging Democratic Power*. WORLD SCIENTIFIC. <https://doi.org/10.1142/9298>
- Adam Chapnick. (1999). The Middle Power. *Canadian Foreign Policy*, 7(2), 73–82.
- Anwar, D. F. (2023). Indonesia's hedging plus policy in the face of China's rise and the US-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region. *The Pacific Review*, 36(2), 351–377. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2160794>
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (2007). ASEAN Charter . In *ASEAN Secretariat*.
- Association of Southeast Asian Nations. (2012). *Declaration of ASEAN Concord II (Bali Concord II)*. Association of Southeast Asian Nations. <https://asean.org/speechandstatement/declaration-of-asean-concord-ii-bali-concord-ii/>
- Aufiya, M. A. (2017). Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum: Contribution in the Indo-Pacific Region. *Andalas Journal of International Studies (AJIS)*, 6(2), 143–158. <https://doi.org/10.25077/ajis.6.2.143-158.2017>
- Azra, A. (2015). Indonesia's Middle Power Public Diplomacy: Asia and Beyond. In *Understanding Public Diplomacy in East Asia* (pp. 131–154). Palgrave Macmillan US. https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137532299_7
- Beeson, M. (2011). Can Australia save the world? The limits and possibilities of middle power diplomacy. *Australian Journal of*

International Affairs, 65(5), 563–577.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2011.607149>

Beeson, M., & Higgott, R. (2014). The changing architecture of politics in the Asia-Pacific: Australia's middle power moment? *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*, 14(2), 215–237.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lct016>

Beeson, M., & Lee, W. (2015). The Middle Power Moment: A New Basis for Cooperation between Indonesia and Australia? In C. B. Roberts, A. D. Habir, & L. C. Sebastian (Eds.), *Indonesia's Ascent* (pp. 224–243). Palgrave Macmillan UK.
https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137397416_11

Carr, A. (2014). Is Australia a middle power? A systemic impact approach. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 68(1), 70–84.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2013.840264>

Central Intelligence Agency. (2021). *The World Factbook 2021*. Central Intelligence Agency. <https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/area/country-comparison>

Cooper, A. F., Higgott, R. A., & Nossal, K. R. (1993). *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*. UBC Press.

Cooper, A. F., & Parlour Dal, E. (2016). Positioning the third wave of middle power diplomacy: Institutional elevation, practice limitations. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis*, 71(4), 516–528.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0020702016686385>

Cooper Andrew F., Higgott Richard A., & Nossal Kim R. (1993). *Relocating middle powers: Australia and Canada in a changing world order*. UBC Press.

Cooper, D. A. (2011). Challenging Contemporary Notions of Middle Power Influence: Implications of the Proliferation Security Initiative for “Middle Power Theory.” *Foreign Policy Analysis*, 7(3), 317–336. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00140.x>

Cox, R. W. (1989). Middlepowermanship, Japan, and Future World Order. *International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy*

Analysis, 44(4), 823–862.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/002070208904400405>

Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (2001). Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 4(1), 391–416.
<https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.4.1.391>

Flemes, D. (2007). *Emerging Middle Powers' Soft Balancing Strategy: State and Perspectives of the IBSA Dialogue Forum*.
<https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1007692>

Grzywacz, A., & Gawrycki, M. F. (2021). The authoritarian turn of middle powers: changes in narratives and engagement. *Third World Quarterly*, 42(11), 2629–2650.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2021.1960159>

G. Thies, C., & C. Sari, A. (2018). A Role Theory Approach to Middle Powers: Making Sense of Indonesia's Place in the International System. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 40(3), 397–421.
<https://doi.org/10.1355/cs40-3c>

Hood, S. J. (1998). The Myth of Asian Style Democracy. *Asian Survey*, 38(9), 853–866.

Hu, W. (2020). The United States, China, and the Indo-Pacific Strategy: The Rise and Return of Strategic Competition. *China Review*, 20(3), 127–142.

Hynek, N. (2004). Canada as a middle power: conceptual limits and promises. *The Central European Journal of Canadian Studies*, 4(1), 33–43.

Iksan, M., & Soong, J.-J. (2022). The Political Economy of Indonesia's Development Strategy under China-USA Power Rivalry and Hegemonic Competition: A Middle Power with Its Hedging Strategy. *The Chinese Economy*, 1–17.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/10971475.2022.2136696>

Jordaan, E. (2003). The concept of a middle power in international relations: distinguishing between emerging and traditional middle powers. *Politikon*, 30(1), 165–181.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/0258934032000147282>

- Karim, M. F. (2017). Role conflict and the limits of state identity: the case of Indonesia in democracy promotion. *The Pacific Review*, 30(3), 385–404. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1249908>
- Keohane, R. O. (1969). Lilliputians' Dilemmas: Small States in Internatinal Politics. *International Organization*, 23(2), 291–310. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830003160X>
- Kuik, C.-C. (2022). Shades of grey: riskification and hedging in the Indo-Pacific. *The Pacific Review*, 1–34. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2022.2110608>
- Laatikainen, K. V. (2006). Pushing Soft Power: Middle Power Diplomacy at the UN. In K. V. Laatikainen & K. E. Smith (Eds.), *The European Union at the United Nations* (pp. 70–91). Palgrave Macmillan UK. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230503731_4
- Lowy Institute. (2023). *Asia Power Index: Indonesia*. Lowy Institute. <https://power.lowyinstitute.org/countries/indonesia/>
- Mubah, A. S. (2019). Indonesia's Double Hedging Strategy toward the United States-China Competition: Shaping Regional Order in the Indo-Pacific? *Issues and Studies*, 55(4).
- MUBAH, A. S. (2019). Indonesia's Double Hedging Strategy toward the United States–China Competition: Shaping Regional Order in the Indo-Pacific? *Issues & Studies*, 55(04), 1940007. <https://doi.org/10.1142/S1013251119400071>
- Patton, S., Sato, J., & Lemahieu, H. (2023). *2023 Key Finding Report*.
- People's Republic of China Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2022, November 14). *President Xi Jinping Meets with U.S. President Joe Biden* in Bali. https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/202211/t20221114_10974686.html
- Ravenhill, J. (1998). Cycles of middle power activism: Constraint and choice in Australian and Canadian foreign policies. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 52(3), 309–327. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357719808445259>

- Robertson, J. (2017). Middle-power definitions: confusion reigns supreme. *Australian Journal of International Affairs*, 71(4), 355–370. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2017.1293608>
- Rosyidin, M. (2020). Promoting a home-grown democracy: Indonesia's approach of democracy promotion in the Bali democracy Forum (BDF). *Asian Journal of Political Science*, 28(3), 312–333. <https://doi.org/10.1080/02185377.2020.1814361>
- Rüland, J. (2017). Democratizing Foreign-Policy Making in Indonesia and the Democratization of ASEAN: A Role Theory Analysis. *TRaNS: Trans -Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia*, 5(1), 49–73. <https://doi.org/10.1017/trn.2016.26>
- Scobell, A. (2021). Constructing a U.S.-China Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific and Beyond. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 30(127), 69–84. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2020.1766910>
- Scott, D. (2019). Indonesia Grapples with the Indo-Pacific: Outreach, Strategic Discourse, and Diplomacy. *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*, 38(2), 194–217. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1868103419860669>
- Shin, S. (2016). South Korea's elusive middlepowermanship: regional or global player? *The Pacific Review*, 29(2), 187–209. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2015.1013494>
- Soward, F. H. (1963). On Becoming and Being a Middle Power: The Canadian Experience. *Pacific Historical Review*, 32(2), 111–136. <https://doi.org/10.2307/4492152>
- Stairs, D. (1998). Of Medium Powers and Middling Roles. In K. Booth (Ed.), *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond* (pp. 270–286). Cambridge University Press.
- Sulaiman, Y. (2019). What Threat? Leadership, Strategic Culture, and Indonesian Foreign Policy in the South China Sea. *Asian Politics & Policy*, 11(4), 606–622. <https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12496>
- Teo, S. (2022). *Middle Power Awkwardness? Indonesia's Norm Entrepreneurship in ASEAN* (pp. 151–176). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-0370-9_6

Walton, D., & Wilkins, T. S. (2019). *Rethinking Middle Powers in the Asian Century*. Routledge.

Wirajuda, H. (2012). Democracy and Diplomacy. *New Zealand International Review*, 37(2), 7–10.

Yazid. (2023). *Keketuaan ASEAN dan Visi Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia*. Indonesia Office of Assistant to Deputy Cabinet Secretary for State Documents & Translation. <https://setkab.go.id/keketuaan-asean-dan-visi-politik-luar-negeri-indonesia/>

Yoshimatsu, H. (2022). Indonesia's response to the Belt and Road Initiative and the Indo-Pacific: A pivotal state's hedging strategy. *Asian Politics & Policy*, 14(2), 159–174. <https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12629>

Declaration of Conflict Interest

The Author declares that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this article.

Biography

Author is a Doctoral student in Taiwan and Regional Studies, National Dong Hwa University.