Enhancing the Role of Hard Approach and Soft Approach Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Indonesia

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Abstract
this research examines the dynamics of counter-terrorism policies in Indonesia from the Old Order (Orde Lama) era to the current period. Terrorist attacks have been a threat to Indonesia's national security since the beginning of the nation's independence. The government is required to counter terrorism through a series of effective policies. This research uses descriptive qualitative method with literature study. This study uses the concept of a hard approach and soft approach counter terrorism typology. The hard approach method refers to the use of armed forces against terror organizations. The soft approach method prioritizes integrated and comprehensive actions in dealing with the problem of radicalism starting from the root of the problem. The hard approach was more used in the early era of independence until the New Order. Meanwhile, the soft approach has been massively used since the establishment of the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) in 2010 until now. At the end, this paper describes three things that need to be done to strengthen the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia: (1) strengthening counter-terrorism regulations, (2) terrorism prevention program, and (3) capacity building of anti-terror organizations in Indonesia.

Keywords: government policy; counter-terrorism; Indonesia; soft approach; hard approach

Introduction

There are two main approaches to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). The first is a violent approach or a violent approach that involves physical interaction to stifle destructive plans by terrorists, such as bombings, attacks, etc. Through the legislature, judiciary, and executive, the state uses methods such as arrest, surveillance, intelligence, and detention to counter terrorist attacks. It is said to be a tough approach because its operations are identical with the involvement of the military and security forces. The second is an approach or soft approach whose main goal is to counteract terrorist ideology through counter-narrative discourses against radical ideologies that encourage political violence (Aljunied, 2011). The soft approach strategy involves more religious figures synergizing with the government. In contrast to the hard approach which is more paralyzing, the main target of the soft approach is to win minds.

More specifically, terrorist organizations in Indonesia can now be mapped into two classifications, namely pro-ISIS militants and anti-ISIS militants (Temby, 2020). Pro-ISIS militant terrorism organizations include Jamaah Ansharul Daulah (JAD) whose activities are mostly on the island of Java in relatively autonomous groups. Then there is Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) which was founded in 2008 by former JI leader, Abu Bakar Ba'Asyir. Next up is the East Indonesia Mujahidin (MIT) who is active in Poso, Central Sulawesi and grew up

with a background of communal conflict. While the second classification is the anti-ISIS terrorism organization which includes Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), which is the largest and most organized terrorism organization in Indonesia. Then there is the Indonesian Mujahideen Council (MMI), which is led by a former Afghan war militant, Abu Jibriel. Next up is Jamaah Anshorul Syariat (JAS), which is a splinter group from JAT. as a form of rejection of Abu Bakar Ba'asyir's 2014 pledge of allegiance to ISIS. This shows the diversity of terrorist organizations in Indonesia which can be a threat to national security stability.

Terrorism in Indonesia not only destabilizes national security threats, but also disrupts the political system, local community cohesion, exacerbates political polarization, and contributes to religious tensions. Plots of attacks continued to occur sporadically, with most plots directed at the Indonesian National Police. Attacks are usually carried out with a knife or improvised explosive device (IED), indicating low technical ability and limited access to weapons. Over time, attack methods have shifted from high-impact weapons that occurred in the 2000s, to low-impact weapons since 2014. As a result, the number of victims of terrorism has decreased significantly since its peak at the time of the 2002 Bali bombings. Despite reduced capabilities, structures ISIS cells in Indonesia are disorganized and disconnected, making detection and interference by security

institutions more difficult. Indonesian authorities called this detection problem a challenge after the attack on the Indonesian Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Wiranto in October 2019.

In general, law enforcement efforts against terrorism groups in Indonesia should be appreciated, especially since the revision of the terrorism law, namely Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning Stipulation of Government Regulations in Lieu of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning Eradication The Crime of Terrorism Becomes a Law. From 2018 to the end of 2019, around 700 people have been detained for terrorism offences. This is a positive impact of Law no. 5 of 2018 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism.

The first jihadist group in Indonesia to declare allegiance to ISIS was the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) in 2014 in the former Poso communal conflict area, Central Sulawesi. Led by Santoso and made up of less than a hundred people isolated in the mountains, MIT never achieved its goal of carving out territory in the name of the Islamic State, though closer than any other group. The defeat of MIT and the assassination of Santoso in July 2016 by the joint special forces of the TNI and Polri are the keys to success in fighting terrorism in Indonesia.

However, terrorism attacks remain a threat to national security. In the current era, there are at least two changes that have exacerbated threat uncertainty. First, the increased operationalization of women is a relatively recent development and an appropriate security approach should be used. Second, the shift to internet-based activities and the rapid changes in the way these technologies are used are growing challenges. Social media has accelerated the goals of terrorist organizations, especially in the recruitment and radicalization process. The government is basically required to tackle terrorism through a series of effective policies. As one of the main tasks and functions of the government, namely to provide a sense of security to the entire community. Therefore, this paper will comprehensively discuss the dynamics of the policies of the government of the Republic of Indonesia in responding to the threat of domestic terrorism.

The counter-terrorism strategy should be viewed through two comprehensive approaches, soft approach and hard approach. Observing the counter-terrorism strategy only through one approach will not be able to show a comprehensive and complete picture. This paper aims to provide an overview of the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia through soft approach and hard approach. There are interesting patterns that can be found from these two approaches. The soft approach and the hard approach also explain the three typologies of counter terrorism strategies, namely (1) war model counter

terrorism strategy; (2) extended criminal justice counter terrorism strategy; and (3) criminal justice counter terrorism strategy. Despite using these two approaches, there are several problems faced by Indonesia in its counter-terrorism strategy. At the end, this paper describes three things that need to be done to strengthen the counter-terrorism strategy in Indonesia, (1) strengthening counter-terrorism regulations, (2) terrorism prevention program, and (3) capacity building of anti-terror organizations in Indonesia.

Research Method

This study uses a qualitative method, with a descriptive type. Qualitative research is a series of processes to collect information on an object, then it is associated with problems from a theoretical or practical point of view. Qualitative is often used in the realm of social science, because it relies on human observation (Sugiyono, 2014). The main characteristics of qualitative research are that it relies on process, criteria for data validity, research design is tentative, and research results are mutually agreed between researchers and informants (Moleong, 2018).

This study uses a basic question, namely "how are the dynamics of counter-terrorism policies in Indonesia?". The result of this research is a series of sentences which are narrated scientifically. Therefore, the type of qualitative research used is descriptive. Broadly speaking, this

type of descriptive research is to present data in the form of a description or narrative about the phenomenon under study. The narrative will be strengthened with the necessary statistical data. In other words, numbers or graphs are only used to strengthen arguments in research, not to be the essence of research.

The explanation of the dynamics of counter-terrorism policies in Indonesia will be elaborated in a descriptive or narrative manner. Reinforced with some necessary statistical data. The data sources in this study emphasize secondary data sources, namely searching documents, journals, books, official websites of related agencies online (on a network). This study uses the concept of a hard approach and soft approach counter terrorism typology. The hard approach method refers to the use of armed forces against terror organizations. The soft approach method prioritizes integrated and comprehensive actions in dealing with the problem of radicalism starting from the root of the problem. The hard approach was more used in the early era of independence until the New Order.

Data collection techniques in this study are observation and documentation. Observation is one of the main methods in qualitative research, which is generally defined as the process of observing or seeing. The observation method is carried out by observing an object to be studied centrally, either through the participation of observers as

participants or the participation of observers as non-participants (Moleong, 2018). In this study, the researcher places himself as a participating observer as a non-participant. Because they are not directly involved in the process of making counter-terrorism policies in Indonesia. However, researchers can still make observations as non-participants through literature or literature studies. Therefore, the documentation method is used to find credible data or documents.

The method of documentation is also closely related to the study of literature. The main point is to collect data that is used as a reference or data source in research (Moleong, 2018). In this case, several literature sources are used such as documents on counter-terrorism agreements in Indonesia, scientific articles, books, related journals, Memorandums of Understanding (MoU), and relevant texts.

After all the data is collected, then the process of data analysis techniques is carried out. Descriptive method was used to analyze the data in this study. Then the interpretation of the data is carried out and arranged descriptively to produce a systematic, accurate, and clear elaboration. Thus, the data collected from Indonesian counter-terrorism policy documents, scientific articles, books, related journals, Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), and relevant texts are analyzed and interpreted descriptively. So that it becomes a reliable research result.

Result

The Dynamics of the Threat of Terrorism in Indonesia before the Emergence of ISIS

The dynamics of the threat of terrorism in Indonesia can be broadly distinguished based on two eras, namely before and after the emergence of ISIS. The differences between these two eras affect the ideology and capacity of attacks or threats from various terrorist organizations in Indonesia. The constellation of the threat of terrorism in Indonesia in the era before the presence of ISIS was dominated by Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) which was formed in 1993. Abdullah Sungkar became an important figure in the formation of JI. The DI split began in 1992 between DI leaders at that time, Ajengan Masduki and Abdullah Sungkar. The internal conflict was triggered by differences of opinion about Ajengan Masduki's desire to build DI representatives in other countries. This opinion was opposed by Abdullah Sungkar, thus triggering tension between the two figures (Mbai, 2014).

Abdullah Sungkar's attitude in leaving DI resulted in significant consequences. Broadly speaking, DI members were divided into two camps, namely the Ajengan Masduki camp and the Abdullah Sungkar camp. Due to Abdullah Sungkar's important role in sending DI jihadis to Afghanistan, some of these jihadists chose to join Abdullah Sungkar's camp, such as Imam Samudra and Hambali (Ali, 2014). This

is a vital factor in JI's strength. The alumni of the Afghan jihad certainly have qualified war capabilities. They have been trained militarily making it easier to form paramilitaries at the bottom line.

Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) is affiliated with Al-Qaeda. This relates to an important JI figure, namely Abdullah Sungkar who played a major role in sending Indonesian jihadists to the Afghanistan war. The experiences gained in Afghanistan have an impact on JI's ability to organize a more systematic pattern of attacks. In addition, JI has great capabilities in assembling high-explosive bombs. The proof is the 2002 Bali Bombing I driven by JI. The bomb, which is thought to have weighed six tons, was able to ravage Legian, Badung, killing 202 people. Even now, the tragedy of the Bali Bombing I is still a terror attack that claimed the largest number of victims in Indonesia.

The terror attacks carried out by JI have a clear target, namely the symbolism of the West. This can be seen from the actions taken by JI in 2000-2009, as follows:

1. On August 1, 2000, a bomb exploded in front of the house of the Philippine Ambassador. Menteng, Central Jakarta. The explosion claimed two lives and 21 injured. Including the Philippine Ambassador Leonides T. Caday, one of the injured. This action was carried out by Abdul Jabar bin Ahmad Kandai, Fatur Rahman AlGhozi, and Edi Setiono.

2. On December 24, 2000, Christmas Eve bombings took place at 38 churches in various regions, including Jakarta, Pekanbaru, Medan, Bandung, Batam, Mojokerto, Mataram, and Sukabumi. This series of events left 19 people dead and 120 injured. The perpetrators of this attack were Hambali, Zoefri, Abdul Jabar, Edi Setiono, Asep, Musa, and Dani.

3. On October 12, 2002, the Bali Bombing I incident occurred. The bomb exploded at the Sari Club and Paddy's Cafe on Jalan Legian, Kuta, Bali. The incident resulted in the death of 202 people. 164 of them were foreigners from 24 countries, 38 others were Indonesians, 209 people were injured. The victims were dominated by Australian citizens. The first Bali bombings were carried out by Amrozi, Ali Imron, Imam Samudra, and Ali Gufron.

4. On August 5, 2003, a bomb exploded at the JW Marriot Hotel, Jakarta, resulting in 11 deaths and 152 injuries. This attack was a suicide bombing carried out by Asmar Latin Sani.

5. On 9 September 2004, a bomb exploded at the Australian Embassy which resulted in five deaths and hundreds of injuries. The suicide bombing attack was carried out by Heri Kurniawan alias Heri Golun who was assisted by Rois, Ahmad Hasan, Apuy, and Sogir alias Abdul Fatah.

6. On October 1, 2005, the second Bali Bombing incident occurred. Bomb exploded at Jimbaran Beach Resort, Kuta. This tragedy resulted in 22 fatalities and 102 injuries. This attack was carried out by Anif Solchanudin alias Short bin Suyadi.

7. On July 17, 2009, suicide bombings exploded at the JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton Hotels. This tragedy resulted in seven deaths and 50 injuries. This attack was carried out by Dani Dwi Permana and Nana Ikhwan Maulana subordinates of Noordin M. Top.

The series of terror attacks carried out by JI show that the target of the action being targeted is a symbol of the West. Like the Bali Bombings I and Bali II Bombings, the target is cafes that are synonymous with Western tourists. Likewise, the bomb tragedy at the JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton hotels is synonymous with the West, especially the United States. JI's targeting is inseparable from the ideology or dogma of Al-Qaeda. As it is known that Al-Qaeda makes the West, especially the United States, a "distant enemy" that must be attacked (Ali, 2014). Therefore, attacks on matters relating to the West in Indonesia became the main reference for the targets of the attacks carried out by JI.

The public exposure resulting from the JI attacks is quite high. This can be seen from the large number of victims, both dead and

injured. The attack that resulted in the highest number of victims occurred in the Bali Bombing I with the death toll reaching 202 people. This large amount of public exposure then had an impact on the publicity of the JI attack. Various national and international media publish terror attacks initiated by JI. In order to normalize the situation and reduce the fear experienced by the wider community, the Indonesian government certainly makes various efforts to deal with this problem.

The exceptionality of JI's attacks was quite varied. For example, the tragedy of the Bali Bombings I and Bali Bombing II were not carried out in the city center, but at the nightlife center. This is different from the bombings at the JW Marriot and Ritz Carlton hotels which were carried out in the nation's capital, namely Jakarta. But the main point of the exception to the JI attack was that it attracted the attention of many people. Although Bali is not the capital of the country, Bali has received great attention on an international scale because it is a tourist attraction that always brings in many foreign tourists. When there was a terror attack in Bali, of course, attention was not only obtained from the Indonesian people, but also the international community. Moreover, the number of victims is dominated by foreign nationals. Meanwhile, the terror acts carried out in Jakarta seemed to show that JI could also attack the nation's capital, which incidentally became the focus of government security.

With over 10,000 members, JI is often cited as the largest militant Islamic organization in Indonesia, and perhaps the most organized. On 28 June 2019, a relatively unknown JI leader, Para Wijayanto, was arrested after a fugitive since 2003. However, JI's activities are currently still operating underground. Soft approaches are needed by the government to be able to reduce potential threats that could occur.

The Dynamics of the Threat of Terrorism in Indonesia after the Emergence of ISIS

The emergence of ISIS in 2014 made various militant and extremist networks in Indonesia pledge allegiance to the leader of ISIS, namely Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Meanwhile, Indonesia's largest jihadist group, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), has chosen to be loyal to its traditional ally in Al-Qaeda. ISIS' rapid territorial gains in Syria and Iraq greatly fueled Indonesian jihadism, attracting young radicals and veteran militants. At first glance, ISIS activists openly held the group's oath of allegiance at prominent mosques and marched with black flags in the streets.

In the ISIS era, the most prominent attacks in Indonesia were the bombings and shootings at Starbucks and shopping centers in downtown Jakarta in January 2016, several family-led suicide bombings against church and police targets in Surabaya in May 2018,

and the knife attack on Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs Wiranto. , in October 2019. Indonesian authorities were caught off guard by the attack's tactical innovation. However, the main focus of ISIS attacks is the police or the National Police. Militants have been locked in a cycle of revenge with the police, whom they see as the main symbol of non-Islamic tyrannical regimes or are often called close enemies. After the police, religious minorities, particularly Christians, have been the most prominent targets, in the national context of increasing political polarization between Islamists and nationalists. This pattern of targeting is different from the pre-ISIS era, when the emphasis was on attacking "far enemies"—US and Western targets, such as international hotel chains and embassies. But ISIS militants have made several attempts to hit Western targets and it is still possible that the movement may shift priority to those targets in the future.

Due to effective counterterrorism policing, Indonesia has so far avoided large-scale ISIS attacks against Western or Indonesian government targets. However, a number of ambitious plots were thwarted by the counterterrorism police unit Densus 88 (Special Detachment 88), including an attempted attack on the tourist island of Bali and a plan to bomb the presidential palace. Indeed, while the number of victims of terrorism in Indonesia has continued to decline since its peak with the Bali Bombings in 2002, the number of arrests

has increased dramatically, reaching unprecedented heights over the past two years.

From 2018 to the end of 2019, around 700 people have been detained for terrorism offences. In 2018 law enforcement powers were strengthened by a revised anti-terrorism law (Anti-Terrorism Law No. 5/2018), which provides for longer detention periods and criminalizes foreign fighters. But the revised law does little to alleviate overcrowding in prisons, where jihadists have in the past radicalized other prisoners and plotted attacks. The first jihadist group in Indonesia to declare allegiance to ISIS was Mujahidin Indonesia Timor (MIT; Mujahidin Indonesia Timur), in 2014 in the former Poso communal conflict area, Central Sulawesi. Led by Santoso and made up of less than a hundred people isolated in the mountains, MIT never achieved its goal of carving out territory in the name of the Islamic State, though closer than any other group.

The defeat of MIT and the assassination of Santoso in July 2016 by the military and counterterrorism forces is the key to success in fighting terrorism in Indonesia. The first prominent militant to declare allegiance to IS was imprisoned cleric Aman Abdurrahman. Through his sermons and writings distributed online, he is convincing in declaring that all civil servants, especially the police, are legitimate targets for attack because they are apostates working for un-Islamic

regimes. Its ability to influence followers from prison to join ISIS illustrates the weakness of Indonesia's approach to terrorist detention. While he continued to be influential, Aman has since been effectively isolated from the jihadi community.

Despite their initial and continued enthusiasm, Indonesian militants have become part of the central ISIS project. A division consisting mostly of Indonesian and Malaysian fighters in Syria organized themselves under the name Katibah Nusantara (Kesatuan Archipelago), led by Indonesian Bahrun Naim. But the group appears to be low in the ISIS hierarchy and marginal in operations in Syria.

Returning to the homeland, although Indonesian militants are implicitly part of the Islamic State's East Asia Region and are sometimes mentioned in media releases by the group, the region was only officially recognized in 2018. Even though the distance from Syria and Iraq could reduce the militants' capabilities Indonesia to take advantage of ISIS. support for operations, such distances also make the course of Indonesian jihadism more unpredictable. While there are no reliable estimates, the number of violent extremists active in Indonesia is unlikely to be in the thousands. The center of militant activity on the most populous island of Java; however jihadi cells have been detected in almost all provinces in Indonesia.

If anything, the geographical reach of the militants is increasing, with small numbers detected in remote areas such as Papua province. Transnational relations serve as an important power multiplier for jihadism in the region, but again the phenomenon is one of a small number of major actors. Indonesians played a key role in the ISIS attack on the Philippine city of Marawi in May 2017. An Indonesian couple played the role of suicide bombers in an attack on a church in Jolo in the Southern Philippines in January 2019, in which twenty-two people were killed. The ISIS project has helped unite jihadists in Southeast Asia, particularly in Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines. Transnational jihadi collaborations will continue to present problems of coordination and intelligence sharing for authorities across the region, with militants buoyed by the impact achieved through cross-border operations like Marawi.

Discussion and Analysis

Policy of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in Combating Terrorism: Hard Approach and Soft Approach Strategy

The data shows that the terrorist is still a threat. The framework for looking into the counter terrorism strategy is to examine the typology of the strategy. The study on counter terrorism divides the typology of strategy into three categories: The study on counter

terrorism divides the typology of strategy into three categories: (1) war model counter terrorism strategy; (2) extended criminal justice counter terrorism strategy; and (3) criminal justice counter terrorism strategy (Privedarshi, 2010).

The war model counter terrorism strategy is based on a strategy in which the military plays an important role. In contrast to the extended criminal justices, the terror is seen as an extraordinary crime that deserves special treatment. The main participant in this strategy is the intelligence agency. The police are the main actor in the criminal justices, and they see terror as an act of crime. To assess the data, the framework of the strategy is used. Considering the type of the strategy, it is important to identify the organization of terrorists who are conducting the attack. The data shows that the main organization of the attack will be the Islamic State in Iraq.

The use of technology in the different categories of typology is divided into soft approach and hard approach. There is only one approach to consider. The war counter terrorism strategy model is more likely to have a hard approach with a heavier sound than the soft one. The tough measures are related to the crisis. The use of military and/or law enforcement techniques, which include the use of force, intelligence and surveillance, as well as killing, capturing, or detaining terrorists. To moderate the radicalization process, the soft approach

seeks to integrate the individual into society. It deals with both rehabilitation and prevention aspects, such as a deradicalization program.

The higher the level of attack can be linked to a more intensive counter terrorism strategy. States have the power to increase or change the strategy, or modify it. The states with a criminal justice system can shift to an extended criminal justice system because they need to respond quicker to the threat. It is not possible to effectively respond to the root cause of the problem of terrorism, which is the preventive mechanism embedded in counter terrorism strategy. The preventive measures were addressed by the United Nations through the Counter Violent Extremism Action Plan, which focuses on women, children, and prison management (Amaritasari, 2018).To discuss the response of the Indonesian government in counter-terrorism efforts, it is also necessary to understand that counter-terrorism efforts in Indonesia are dynamic and develop from time to time. The history of countering terrorism in Indonesia is divided into two types of approaches, namely, the hard approach and the soft approach (McKay & Webb, 2015) . These two types of approaches appear based on the different backgrounds of acts of terrorism so that they become considerations for strategies to overcome them.

The hard approach method tends to lead to the use of armed forces against terror organizations. This approach is based on Presidential Decree No. 11/1963 on the Eradication of Subversion Activities issued during the Old Order. Meanwhile, the soft approach method prioritizes integrated and comprehensive actions in dealing with the problem of radicalism starting from the root of the problem. This method uses persuasive methods, dialogue, and prioritizes community involvement in countering radicalism (Center for Peaceful Media - BNPT, 2019) .

It has been explained previously that Indonesia has a long history of dealing with the threat of radicalism and terrorism. This history has led to efforts to counter terrorism continue to develop to this day. The story of efforts to overcome the threat of radicalism and terrorism begins when SM Kartosuwirjo proclaimed an independent Islamic state in 1949 in West Java during the Old Order era. The Indonesian government at that time called Kartosuwirjo's movement a rebellion and quickly ordered the army to suppress the rebel groups and retake the provinces and several areas occupied by DI/NII.

Not only DI/NII, a number of rebellion cases also occurred during the Old Order era such as those carried out by the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia (PRRI), the People's Struggle of the Universe (Permesta) and the Ratu Adil Armed Forces (APRA).

Although some movements are based on certain religious ideologies, most group movements are motivated by the spirit of separatism. In responding to this case, the approach taken is based on a hard approach which involves armed confrontation with military forces.

In the New Order era, the Decree of the President of the Republic of Indonesia No. 11/1963 which in the Old Order era was used as the basis for countering terrorism was considered invalid. However, in 1969, the regulation was strengthened into Law No. 11/PNPS/1963 which later became the basis for taking action against terrorism using the hard approach method. In the New Order era, there was a slight shift in the background of the terrorism movement. Whereas previously the terrorism movement was based on the spirit of separatism, in the New Order era, acts of terrorism began to emerge based on the interpretation of certain religious teachings (Hasan, Hendriks, Janssen, & Meijer) . Even so, the direction of counter-terror policy in the New Order era relied more on covert intelligence operations than the strategy of armed confrontation as was the case in the Old Order.

Then in the Reformation era, Law no. 11/PNPS/1963 was officially revoked through the stipulation of Law no. 26 of 1999. To create a specific legal umbrella regarding efforts to counter terrorism, the Government issued Government Regulation in Lieu of Law (Perpu)

No. 1 of 2002 which was later ratified as Law No. 15 of 2003 concerning the Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism. This regulation arose because of the increasing number of acts of terrorism such as bombings and suicide bombings targeting houses of worship, crowd centers and embassies of other countries. Until its peak, the Bali Bombing 1 occurred on October 12, 2002 which became the beginning of the turning point in efforts to combat terrorism in Indonesia (Villarosa & Hwang, 2017) .

However, the regulations that had been formed at that time were considered unable to overcome the problem of terrorism. The assessment is based on the reality that terrorist organizations are increasingly systematic in their recruitment and regeneration, so the government needs to make strategic steps in responding to these problems. The DPR RI responded to this through a Working Meeting between Commission 1 and the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal and Security Affairs (Menkopolhukam) on August 31, 2009. Furthermore, the results of the discussion were manifested in the establishment of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) which was based on a Presidential Decree. Number 46 of 2010 concerning the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT).

The establishment of the BNPT is the beginning of the start of a new method in counter-terrorism efforts that prioritizes a soft

approach. In an effort to counter terrorism, BNPT emphasizes efforts that are integrative and comprehensive by using a more persuasive approach. It is intended that the program implemented by BNPT can touch the root causes of acts of terrorism, namely ideology, economic inequality, and social problems. In this case, BNPT acts as a leading sector that coordinates every resource from various elements, both government and society in the context of tackling terrorism.

After explaining the historical developments related to efforts to eradicate terrorism, in this paper the next discussion will focus on the policies of the Indonesian government as a response to acts of terrorism. In general, counter-terrorism efforts as the government's response to criminal acts of terrorism include three things, namely:

1. Strengthening Counter -Terrorism Regulations

    Strengthening regulations against criminal acts of terrorism is important considering that terrorism is an extraordinary crime. There are several factors that cause the phenomenon of terrorism to be taken seriously. First, with the development of technology and information, terrorist groups have carefully exploited it to achieve their goals. Utilization of technology and information raises the potential that acts of terror can create much greater damage and victims. Second, acts of terrorism are discriminatory against every ordinary citizen. Terror acts are also carried out

against state institutions that are considered targets by terror groups. Third, today's terrorist groups are no longer in isolation. This means that terrorist groups are also evolving along with international organized crime organizations. This has led to the linkage of terrorism crimes with other crimes, such as money laundering, drug trafficking to illegal arms trade.

Therefore, seeing the potential threats of acts of terrorism that are increasingly diverse, the Indonesian government has carried out a series of strengthening of the regulations governing

terrorism countermeasures. The strengthening of regulations on counter-terrorism has been carried out since the Old Order, then the New Order until the last one was carried out in the Reform Order. These changes include changes in the approach taken in efforts to combat terror, several authorities of law enforcement officers, criminalization of several activities related to acts of terrorism to the definition of acts of terrorism itself.

In the latest legislation, namely Law Number 5 of 2018, there are several changes. These changes include:

1) n Law Number 5 of 2018 there is already a definition of terrorism. Article 1 of the Law explains that Terrorism is an act of using violence or threats of violence that creates a widespread atmosphere of terror or fear, which can cause mass

casualties, and/or cause damage or destruction to strategic vital objects, the environment, the environment, and the environment. public facilities, or international facilities with ideological, political, or security disturbance motives.

2) In Article 10A of Law Number 5 of 2018, there is criminalization of criminal acts related to terrorism such as trading in potential materials as explosives and inserting or removing chemical, biological, radiological weapons and other components to commit terrorism crimes from the territory of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Indonesia.

3) Article 12B contains criminalization of acts of organizing, providing or participating in military training at home and abroad with the aim of committing criminal acts of terrorism.

4) In article 12A there is an expansion of criminal sanctions against corporations involved in criminal acts of terrorism and sanctions are imposed on founders, leaders, management or people who control corporations.

5) Article 12B also contains additional penalties in the form of revocation of the right to have a passport for every Indonesian citizen who is convicted of terrorism.

6) Article 25 stipulates the total time of detention starting from the stage of investigation until the extension of detention which has a total duration of 290 days.

7) Articles 35 and 36 regulate the protection of victims of acts of terrorism as a form of state responsibility. In this case, the form of state responsibility includes medical assistance, psychosocial and psychological rehabilitation, compensation for the victim's family and compensation.

8) In article 43, it is regulated about the involvement of the Indonesian National Army in dealing with acts of terrorism as part of military operations other than war.

2. Terrorism Prevention Program

This is a mandate from Law Number 5 of 2018 which states that the Government is obliged to make efforts to prevent criminal acts of terrorism. The important thing that needs to be realized in this regard is that it is not enough to deal with terrorism by relying solely on the anti-terror apparatus. As has been done by the United States in countering terrorism by using a security approach, which states that terrorism cannot be overcome only with violence, but must tend to lead to solving the root problems.

If you look at the track record of perpetrators of terrorism in Indonesia, most of the perpetrators who join terrorist groups do not come from the environment and family traditions that have a radical understanding. The involvement of the terrorists is influenced by education and experience factors. In addition, inequality in social and economic strata is also often the cause of someone to join a terrorist group (Eubank, 2006) . Therefore, it is no less important to involve the community in the prevention and early detection of criminal acts of terrorism.

To anticipate this, Law Number 5 of 2018 has also discussed and explained efforts to prevent terrorism crimes. Based on the regulation, terrorism prevention can be done through three things, namely National Preparedness, Counter Radicalization and Deradicalization. National preparedness is defined as a state of readiness to anticipate the occurrence of criminal acts of terrorism through a planned, integrated, systematic and continuous process. This National Preparedness is divided into five forms, among others: (1) Community empowerment; (2) Increasing the capacity of the apparatus; (3) Improvement of Facilities and Infrastructure; (4) Development of terrorism studies; and (5) Mapping of areas prone to radical understanding of terrorism.

Next is counter-radicalization which is a planned, integrated, systematic and continuous process that is carried out against people or groups of people who are vulnerable to being exposed to radical ideas of terrorism with the aim of stopping the spread of radical ideas of terrorism. Counter radicalization is carried out either directly or indirectly through counter narrative, counter propaganda and counter ideology. And the last is deradicalization, which is a process to eliminate or reduce and reverse the radical understanding of terrorism that has occurred. This deradicalization process goes through four stages, namely identification and assessment, rehabilitation, re-education and social reintegration.

3. Capacity Building of Anti - Terror Organizations in Indonesia

In the context of preventing and overcoming terrorism, the government must have established a number of institutions that focus on the issue of terrorism. Institutions that have been established by the government include BNPT, Special Detachment (Densus) 88 and intelligence agencies. The establishment of these institutions is expected to be able to synergize and become a means of countering terrorism in Indonesia.

In carrying out its duties, the BNPT institution places more emphasis on integrated and comprehensive counter-terrorism efforts, namely by prioritizing a persuasive approach with various programs

that target the root of the problem. Then, there is the Densus 88 institution which was formed by the National Police to optimize counter-terrorism in Indonesia. Densus 88 is a special unit designed as an anti-terror unit with various competencies such as investigative experts, explosives experts and batting units in which there are sniper experts (Sanur, 2016) .

The next institution that also plays a role in counter-terrorism efforts is intelligence. In Law Number 17 of 2011 concerning State Intelligence, it is explained that Intelligence is a party that plays a role in carrying out efforts, work, activities and actions in early detection and early warning for prevention, deterrence and countermeasures against any threats that threaten national interests and security. . In particular, in counter-terrorism efforts, intelligence is tasked with anticipating and detecting as early as possible any social change and social rapid process. The effectiveness of intelligence will be useful as material for policy makers in determining strategies and policies to tackle terrorism.

Conclusion

In conclusion, the Indonesian government has various policies related to counter-terrorism. The various types of policies are caused by the different backgrounds of the terrorism movement that was carried out from the Old Order era to the Reform Order era. The

various dynamics that occurred in the past have made the current Indonesian government's policy more complex in addressing the issue of terrorism. In general, the threat of terrorism in Indonesia is divided into two phases, namely before the emergence of ISIS and after the presence of ISIS. This phase difference brings significant changes to the constellation of terrorist attacks in Indonesia.

Countering terrorism in Indonesia is divided into two types of approaches, namely, the hard approach and the soft approach. The hard approach method tends to lead to the use of armed forces against terror organizations. This approach is based on Presidential Decree No. 11/1963 on the Eradication of Subversion Activities issued during the Old Order. Meanwhile, the soft approach method prioritizes integrated and comprehensive actions in dealing with the problem of radicalism starting from the root of the problem. This method uses persuasive methods, dialogue, and prioritizes community involvement in countering radicalism.

The hard approach was more used in the early era of independence until the New Order. Meanwhile, the soft approach was massively used in the Reformation era, especially since the establishment of the National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT) in 2010. Currently, Indonesia's policies in counter-terrorism strategies are divided into three, namely strengthening counter-terrorism

regulations, making programs to prevent acts of terrorism. terrorism crimes, and increase the capacity of anti-terror organizations.

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Declaration of Conflict Interest

The Author declares that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this article.

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