Rising of Chinese Blue Water Navy and American Hegemony In Asia Pacific

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Abstract
Currently, China is growing into a new maritime power in the world. This country is listed with the largest number of commercial vessels with over 1,000 gross tons. The port of Shanghai has also transformed into one of the busiest ports globally, rivaling the Port of Amsterdam in terms of total cargo volume. China’s shipping industry currently occupies the third position in the world. The maritime industry is increasingly competitive to ensure stable economic performance, but on the other hand, it is still highly dependent on secure access to markets and resources, particularly iron and fossil fuels. Taking into account the condition of the Chinese Navy and the government’s Chinese Efforts to become a new maritime power in the world, China is currently trying to establish itself to realize its dream, namely the ability to become a force in blue water navy order to seize the United States’ Hegemony in the Asia Pacific Region.

Keywords: Blue Water Navy; Maritime Power; Maritime Security; Asia Pacific
Introduction

In the last 30 years, China has become a significantly influential country in every political intrigue in the world. China appears to be a potential candidate as a superpower, offering a new alternative to the US preeminence in global politics. Now China is beginning to openly state that it will seek to gain status as a Great Power (Koda 2017). This rise of China has resulted in unique ties to the US. The complex balance between the two countries results in different patterns of interdependence and interest interactions. First, the China Rising has led to renewal and improvement of collaboration in the stability of the world order between the US and China, which has resulted in many global issues, especially in the economic and trade aspects. Second, the rise of China has increased fear and threat. Differences in interests and political orientations between the US and China allow conflict between the two countries (Zhan 1994).

Since 2008, China's attitude has shifted to a more assertive and sometimes even evasive approach when there is potential for competition. Indeed, China has adopted a slightly revisionist approach in some cases, which could lead to further tensions with the status quo approach from the US. From the rise of the G20 as the main economic forum to discuss global issues to establishing a Development Bank with BRICS, China has also pushed for alternative multilateral institutions. Although China and the US officially have a political
relationship that develops based on trust and mutual respect between the two countries, the intersection of interests is still vulnerable to occur (Boylan, McBeath, and Wang 2021). This dual leadership structure certainly affects the distribution of regional power. For example, China's increasing economic strength was very helpful in maintaining economic stability in the Asia Pacific during the 2008 global financial crisis (Fernald and Babson 2005). While China's record-high economic growth could offset negative US growth, China was thus able to play a stable and profitable economic role for developing countries. Other countries (Morrison 2014).

Until the late 1980s, China did not have an integrated regional policy and focused specifically on the Asia Pacific. However, China has begun to increase the strategic focus of bilateral relations and foreign policy more oriented towards geostrategic interests (Shah 2017). With its growing status as an economic and military power, China has also proposed a series of initiatives to manage its relationship specifically with the US. In 2012, during a trip to Washington, Xi Jinping called for establishing a platform, ‘A New Type of Great Power Relations In The 21st Century’ (Laub 1999). This platform represents China's initiative to avoid confrontation between the two superpowers. For some Chinese scholars, this China initiative continues the 'G2' and 'Chimerica' initiatives introduced in 2008 to manage relations between Beijing and Washington (Ross 2010; deLisle 2020). Currently, Xi
Jinping's proactive diplomacy is trying to reshape Sino-US relations in the future by promoting the idea of a 'New Type of Great Power Relations. Some argue that this concept is a 'trap' for the US planned by China (ZENG and BRESLIN 2016). While some optimists still view this approach as an opportunity to integrate China into the global order and seek a durable foundation in US-China relations (Zheng 2016, 423-425).

Xi Jinping is a very strong and innovative leader in looking at global governance. Distinguished from his predecessors, Xi moved more swiftly and decisively to pursue China's main interests. These interests include maximizing China's influence in the Western Pacific region, building China's economic relations with countries in the region, reunification with Taiwan, and asserting China's territorial claims in the South and East China Seas, pursued by strengthening maritime technology and military capabilities (Blazevic 2010). China's regional economic policies are also designed to enhance inter-connectivity while playing a role in existing multilateral mechanisms. Xi is also working to maintain a positive relationship with the US while preparing for the possibility of strategic competition. Xi's actions have been designed to serve the purpose of this activity, but with China's expanding capabilities, there have been concerns over whether its escalation will be peaceful or threaten security stability (Kuik, Idris, and Md Nor 2012)
Research Method

This study focuses on descriptive methods, showing how the dynamics of international politics and maritime security are developing in the Asia Pacific region. This study also applies a data analysis mechanism based on a literature review, where the data collected from research results and media information related to the object being analyzed. Rising China’s economy is not only the only challenge for the Asia Pacific region, and maritime security is one of the issues that has caught the attention of this region. This research departs from the maritime security phenomenon in the Pacific region, especially how the United States has long been trying to show the hegemony of their naval power, so this is a concern for China. China responded to American hegemony in the Asia Pacific maritime region by developing its navy, the Blue Water Navy. This article will emphasize how the dynamics of maritime security affect the Asia Pacific region.

Result

Highlighting China's naval power development, it will be more comprehensive if it is not focused solely on the procurement of new warships and aircraft. The review also needs to touch on other crucial and interrelated issues, such as strategy and doctrine, the organization of the Chinese Navy, personnel development, interoperability of the
Chinese Navy with other forces, and foreign navies and visits by Chinese warships abroad (O'Rourke 2021; 2020).

Regarding the combat structure, the Chinese Navy has about 75 combatant ships consisting of destroyers and frigates, more than 60 submarines, 55 large amphibious ships and about 70 guided missile fast patrol boats. In addition to adding guided-missile combatants to its combat lineup, China's naval power has also increased its nuclear submarines (O'Rourke 2021; Laub 1999). In recent developments, two Shan-class nuclear attack submarines (Type 093) and one JIN-class ballistic missile submarine (Type 094) have been added to the combat lineup to accompany four Han-class submarines and one Xia-class submarine (Chase 2013). The Chinese Navy also has ambitions to have a domestically made aircraft carrier. The country has purchased two former Soviet carriers, the Kiev and the Varyag. It is suspected that from the purchase, China will learn how to design the aircraft carrier. The results of these activities will then be used as a basic science in developing local aircraft carriers (Yoshihara and Holmes 2008).

According to the People's Liberation Army (PLA), war can be either local or total, where war is a struggle to achieve the political goals of the nation as a whole (Teixeira Júnior and Da Silva 2020; Chapman 2017). The campaign serves as an operational link with the implementation of the battle. According to the PLA, war is guided by
strategy, campaign methods guide campaigns, and tactics guide battles. The PLA published a document entitled The National Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period. The document, similar to the National Military Strategy in other countries, has two main components (Fanell 2019b).

The first is reform and modernization, which includes modernization efforts, equipment development and procurement and institutional and organizational reform (MacHaffie 2020). Included in this first component is the PLA's transformation program, namely:

- From soldiers prepared to fight in local warfare under ordinary conditions, to soldiers preparing to fight and win in local warfare under modern conditions and high technology;
- From an army based on quantity to an army based on quality;
- From an army based on personnel intensive to an army based on science and technology-intensive.

Second, namely, operations that provide several comprehensive and essential tools in fundamental approaches to carrying out the war. Operational guidelines at the national level are general and do not provide specific directions for operations at the campaign or tactical level or even specific contingencies (Chase 2013). The current operational component of the National Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period, known as Active Defense, has been adapted to
carry out "Local Warfare Under Modern High-Tech Conditions" (Rahman and Tsamenyi 2010; Chase 2013; O'Rourke 2021). Active Defense is the ultimate strategy guide for all PLA operations during war and preparation for war in peacetime, so it applies to the Chinese Navy. By the Chinese Navy, Active Defense was revealed in Offshore Defense Strategy in 1985 and was approved by the Central Military Commission of the Chinese Communist Party (Agnihotri 2012).

Operationally, the Offshore Defense Strategy emphasizes the following:

- Overall, the military strategy is defensive. We attack only after being attacked. But the operations are offensive;
- Space or time will not limit our offensive opponents;
- We will not set a line on our offensive boundaries; We will wait for the times and circumstances in our power's favour when initiating offensive operations;
- We will focus on the weaknesses of the opponent's strengths;
- We will use our strength to nullify the enemy's strength;
- Offensive operations against the opponent and defensive operations for the protection of our forces will be carried out simultaneously.

If studied further, Offshore Defense which the Chinese Navy now adopts is a new paradigm. The paradigm shift is not only in the operational aspects of the Navy but also touches the aspect of power...
building through the modernization of the Navy. The previous paradigm adopted by the Chinese Navy was Coastal Defense which focused on planning and operating in China's coastal areas to support significant land wars (Ji and Xu 1991).

The paradigm shifts emerged Offshore Defense at the same time as the Chinese economic modernization program led by Deng Xiaoping (Agnihotri 2012). In the modernization program, what happened was a shift in economic centres from the interior of China to the east coast of the country and gave birth to China's significant dependence on resources originating from abroad, including oil (Ji and Xu 1991).

However, it should be understood that the security (supply) of petroleum has never actually appeared in official documents or official statements of the Chinese government. Offshore Defense is a strategic concept that directs the Chinese Navy to prepare to fulfil three critical missions "for the new period" through engaging in maritime operations at sea and building a Navy capable of carrying out sustainable operations at sea (Scott 2019; Agnihotri 2012). The Chinese Navy's three critical missions are:

- Keeping the enemy within limits and resisting invasion from the sea;
- Protect national territorial sovereignty;
• Maintaining the integrity of the motherland and maritime rights

The strength of the three Chinese Naval Fleet is relatively balanced in strength. Each fleet is equipped with various types of warships, such as nuclear and diesel-electric submarines, destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, etc (O'Rourke 2021). There is also a Naval Aviation unit in each fleet, in addition to the Coast Defense Force. The Marine Corps combat unit is only in the Southern Sea Fleet, which consists of two brigades (Rosenberg and Chung 2008).

Related to the change in strategy from coastal Defense to offshore Defense, training materials such as car and support operations, operating in unfamiliar and unknown areas and so on are currently the focus of the Chinese Navy. The training is carried out in the three fleets, and at a specific time, twice a year, the three fleets will carry out joint training at sea. However, the training cannot be classified as an exercise because the Chinese Navy exercises are based on specific scenarios (Jenner 2021).

Discussion and Analysis

The training for warship elements in the Chinese Navy’s fleet consists of three stages. The first phase runs from November to January or February of the following year, during which not all warships are fully manned. The second stage runs from March to June.
The third stage is carried out in early summer (July) until the end of October. This stage is a final exercise involving all elements of the three Chinese Navy fleets. The Chinese Navy divides the exercises into 14 categories from a nomenclature review, ranging from individual warship exercises to joint naval exercises. The last type of exercise involving elements of the Navy with elements of other forces (Lague and Lim 2020).

Concerns about the threat of China's influence expansion were 'subtly' dismissed by China with the 'strategies low Profile' and 'Peaceful Development' initiated since Deng Xiaoping's time. For decades this policy has been effective. Recent trends in Chinese diplomacy under Xi's leadership show that China's strategy towards Asia emphasizes an 'approach Harmonious Asia.' This phrase contains the meaning of 'togetherness,' which is certainly very interesting for the regional community. China uses three approaches to develop this strategy: economic cooperation, strategic partnership, and multilateral security. China's economic cooperation approaches Asia Pacific countries as bilateral partners in the first strategic path and uses multilateral channels to develop and intensify economic relations. For example, an increase in the proportion of external trade and investment. China has also entered into a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with ASEAN and is still coordinating trade with Australia, India, and South Korea. China also continues to strengthen sub-regional
cooperation along the Mekong River. China's approach to One Belt One Road (OBOR) also strongly characterizes this strategy (Cox et al. 2018; Li et al. 2020).

Furthermore, the second approach of 'Harmonious Asia' is to build strategic partnerships for peaceful coexistence with neighboring countries. China always strives to strengthen bilateral relations with countries through this strategic partnership (Tow 2011; Feng and Huang 2014). However, there is much pessimism, especially in China's claims in the South China Sea case. This collective approach is still considered effective enough to cooperate with countries in the region.

The third component of the Chinese approach is the multilateral security fabric. Initially, China's mindset was still very classic, that multilateral organizations would be against national interests, but with the 16th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 2002, it became a new reference for a more optimistic Chinese mindset change. Not only actively participating in forums such as APEC, ASEAN+3, ASEAN+1, and actively participated in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), East Asian Summit (EAS), and joint maritime security initiatives in the OBOR initiative. Furthermore, China is deploying peacekeepers to conflict areas and continuing joint military exercises with other countries. In summary, 'Harmonious Asia' effectively reflects the universal value of togetherness in contemporary Chinese diplomatic strategy (Morrison 2014; Ye 2019)
The emergence of China's geoeconomic approach is a determining factor in achieving geostrategic interests. Strong economic growth and the expansion of China's domestic market are increasingly widespread, making China the largest producer of goods in Asia. China has also strengthened its export competitiveness, causing changes in the economic transactions of neighboring countries in Asia (Goh and Simon 2007). The regional economic policy was finally able to establish China as a new influential power in the region. With the absence of the US in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and now the emergence of a new OBOR initiative, the US is now clearly 'handing over' its economic influence in the Asia Pacific region to China (Chong 2018). China's ambitious TORCH infrastructure plans are implemented in constructing dams, roads, settlements, and high-speed railways that will integrate the South and West regions of China. In this sense, Asia Pacific can be said to have been 'dominated by China. With the development of Asian railway construction, countries such as Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan will gain commercial sea access through Iranian ports. In this way, OBOR can even reopen the Indo-Pacific rail route with control under China (Ploberger 2017; Das 2017; Yu 2017; Engelbert 2020).

Thailand and Indonesia have also been drawn closer to China's political influence through an economic approach (Damuri 2019). The Thai military government has not had a cozy relationship with the US,
especially since the Obama administration, and now China and Thailand are collaborating on a $5.1 billion high-speed rail project. Indonesia, in the era of Joko Widodo, has also increasingly established close relations with China. China is actively involved in infrastructure development in Indonesia, which includes the construction of 24 ports, 15 airports, construction of 1,000 km of roads, construction of 8,700 km of railroads, and the construction of a power plant with a capacity of 35 thousand megawatts (Damuri 2019). In addition, the Government of Indonesia, through the Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board/ Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal (BKPM), has again offered many infrastructure projects worth IDR 217 trillion to China through Investment Roadshows (market sounding) in two major Chinese cities namely Beijing and Tianjin (Dhara Ranasinghe and Saikat Chatterjee 2021). If the Philippines, Indonesia, Thailand, and other countries get closer to China, this all can shake the foundations of the geopolitical orientation of ASEAN countries.

So far, this Chinese strategy has paid off quite well. The geostrategy carried out by China is a strategy to capture various opportunities of interest that can be maximized in the region. In other words, through this approach, China can face intense competition with other big countries (Dugis 2018, 15). However, this Chinese approach also faces some challenges, especially with the US. First, if the US under Trump can reorient policies that are more oriented to smart
power and provide economic benefits for all regional countries, it can change the architecture of economic hegemony carried out by China so far. In addition, the US can also 'use' Japan to create a regional diplomatic strategy and collaborate to become China's strategic rival. If China finds it difficult to harmonize relations with regional countries, the US and Japan can take over regional economic cooperation's 'steering wheel' (Hwang and Dongxiao 2010).

The Strategies New Type of Great Power Relations and Harmonious Asia has been a positive signal about China's responsible behavior. China's identity has shifted into a major power that challenges US economic and trade interests. Although on the other hand, as many have reviewed in this paper, the rise of China has more 'threatened' US security interests (Hao 2015). On the one hand, the pattern of this security rivalry relationship is unique because it tends to be different from the security rivalry between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. However, as this article also reveals, the US and China must continue to look for ways so that the strategic relationship between the two countries does not negatively affect regional security stability. It is almost certain that we will see more of China's increasing power in the future regional order, which the One Belt One Road initiative has now demonstrated. A better understanding of China's rise and strategic intentions requires closer scrutiny of China's every move. The next challenge is that the US
needs to find a balance between 'accepting' a bigger global role for China while building ways to 'counter' coercive interests from China. In short, this is where rivalry as security compromises finds its importance. A reasonable approach is to continue to involve China to play a bigger role in supporting the global security system. This effort is expected to reduce the escalation of competition and secure mutual interests between the US and China.

**Development of China's Blue Water Navy**

China has no secret aspirations to develop a Navy capable of being projected far from its territory. The development of the Chinese Navy is within the framework of the Chinese government's policy to maintain economic growth and development, maintain domestic political stability, defend China's national sovereignty and territorial integrity, and secure China's status as a great power. The stability of the country's economic growth before the 2008 economic crisis made China a new power in the world. The economic improvement is followed by the development of the China Seapower, which is directed to project power to secure its national interests outside the jurisdiction (O'Rourke 2021).

According to data, China is now growing into a new maritime power in the world. This country is listed with the largest number of commercial vessels with over 1,000 gross tons. The port of Shanghai
has also transformed into one of the busiest ports globally, rivaling the Port of Amsterdam in terms of total cargo volume (Koda 2017). China's shipping industry currently occupies the third position in the world. The maritime industry is increasingly competitive to ensure stable economic performance, but on the other hand, it is still highly dependent on secure access to markets and resources, particularly iron and fossil fuels. China realizes that dependence on foreign parties is a vulnerability in itself if a conflict arises. Therefore, the fact of dependence has shaped China's strategic behavior in the region and the world (O'Rourke 2021).

One of them concerns regional security; apart from being vulnerable to depending on oil supplies abroad, China also has territorial disputes with several countries in the Asia Pacific region. In addition, the Taiwan issue and the dispute over the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands have also received great attention in China's national security. The regional security situation cannot be separated from the significant role of the United States, which will impact China, especially when it is associated with economic factors (Scott 2012; O'Rourke 2021; Koda 2017). China's dependence on oil supplies from abroad, especially the Middle East, whose naval power projection capabilities have not followed, puts the country at a disadvantage. According to the strategic thinking that developed there, parties with conflicting interests with China can exploit this weakness in a conflict.
For example, through termination of sea transportation lines, causing blockade of the remote(distant blockade). Therein lies vulnerabilities of China's maritime that Chinese strategists are well aware of (Kennedy 2018).

From there, some foreign parties argue that China's aspiration to develop a blue-water navy is to maintain SLOC, especially oil supplies. China's SLOC extends from the Middle East through Southeast Asia and ends in the East Asia region is vulnerable to threats and challenges because the major countries are mostly involved in geopolitical competition with China (Chan 2020). In addition, as a new player in the maritime industry, it is difficult for China to avoid the need to protect its ships from various threats and challenges. On classical maritime strategy theory, one of the fundamental functions of the Navy is to protect the merchant fleet. Of course, it is a risky thing if the growth of China's maritime industry, including its commercial fleet, is not matched by the ability of its Navy to protect the industry (Kashin, Krasheninnikova, and Piatchkova 2020).

One piece of evidence supporting the truth of this opinion is the dispatch of the Chinese Naval Task Force to Somali waters since 2008. In addition to testing the Chinese Navy's ability to carry out long-range naval operations, the shipment was also prompted by many pirate attacks against several Chinese-flagged merchant ships (Zhu
2018). In addition to Somalia, annually, a Chinese Naval Task Force carries out goodwill to several countries far from the mainland, such as Hawaii and the west coast of the United States, Southeast Asia, and the Indian Ocean (Fanell 2019a)

So it can be concluded that the factors driving China's aspirations to develop a blue-water navy cannot be separated from the national strategy it adheres to. The strategy is to manage external pressures to ensure a conducive environment for economic development. China's current foreign and security policy is based on that strategy. However, the problem is that it is not easy to dismiss the concerns of countries in the Asia Pacific region about the hidden agenda as a driving factor in the development of the Navy. It has become the belief of most countries in the region that the development of maritime power is China to deal with the Taiwan problem and beyond Taiwan. Although the country has established a national strategy as described previously, the fundamental question that foreign parties often raise is how China achieves the goals that have been set and at the same time how to prevent conflicts with neighboring countries and also the United States (Beeson 2009).

China has several territorial claims with neighboring countries, including Indonesia, regarding the nine-dash line to the waters around the Natuna Islands on the 1992 Map. Likewise, with the United States,
the two countries have been involved in several serious incidents in the economic zone in the last ten years. Exclusively around China around the issue of freedom of navigation versus state sovereignty at sea. The latest notable case is the survey vessel USNS Impeccable (T-AGOS 23) and five Chinese vessels located 75 miles south of Hainan Island in the South China Sea on March 8, 2009. Issues of territorial claims with neighboring countries and incidents of repeated encounters with US Navy ships and aircraft usually rekindle questions in the region about China's intentions to develop a blue-water navy. Although China has clearly stated that one of the goals of developing its naval power is to secure its economic interests, the level of suspicion from other countries is still high that this power can also be used to "secure China's status as a great power" in a broad sense (Tow 2011).

Regarding the development of China's military strength in general and the Navy in particular, several countries in the region have given a "less friendly" response. Such as defense cooperation ties involving India, Australia, Japan, and the United States, implicitly aimed at stemming China. It could be seen from a series of Malabar Exercises carried out regularly in the ocean Indian and the Philippine Sea off the coast of Okinawa Island in recent years (Lin and Singer 2017).
China's blue water navy and its implications for stability in the Asia Pacific region

Considering the current condition of the Chinese Navy, which is trying to develop itself to realize its dream, namely the ability to become a force, its blue water navy is still questionable. The step towards a blue water navy cannot be limited to adding many warships and Navy aircraft but needs to be followed by broad improvements in operational aspects of the Chinese Navy. China's ability to carry out long-range naval operations is still far from expectations. The same condition also occurs regarding the ability to control the sea, which is only limited to its territorial waters and a small portion of the EEZ that the endurance of its fighter aircraft can achieve. It is a fact that the Chinese Navy has not been able to exercise maritime control on its SLOC, even on the line stretching from Chinese territory to the Straits of Malacca. Also covering the operational aspect is the issue of command and control on warships that are far from mainland China. It remains a question to what extent the issue of command and control on Chinese warships can be solved, especially when the ship is operating far from mainland China, and there is a communication breakdown between the Chinese Naval Command Center and the ship. As is known, there is a dualism of command between the ship’s commander and the political commissar officer on the Chinese warship. This issue is even more crucial when it comes to the operational aspects of
submarines because the Chinese Navy's capabilities so far are still limited in terms of communication between submarines operating at sea and Puskodal.

The next operational aspect is logistical support, particularly the ability to replenishment at sea. So far, there has been no significant increase in the quantity of the auxiliary ships of the Chinese Navy compared to the previous few years. The majority of RAS-capable auxiliary vessels are not yet ocean cruising qualified. In addition, China does not yet have comprehensive and tested knowledge and experience regarding logistics support systems in remote operations. The second, the training aspect. The duration of exercises carried out by the Navy Chinese On the high seas, both with the Air Force and Chinese with foreign navies, is still quite low. As previously explained, the quality of interoperability between the Chinese Navy and its Air Force is still shrouded in several problems.

The issue of exercises on the high seas—such as in the SLOC between Chinese waters and the Malacca Strait—is important to underline because there can be tested various doctrines, strategies, and tactics that have previously been studied theoretically. Moreover, for the Navy Chinese, which has aspirations to become a force blue water navy. Considering the current cycle of the exercises of the Chinese Navy, it is reflected that the cycle is thus supportive of the direction to
achieve these aspirations. Likewise, the intensity of training with foreign navies. Except with the Russian Navy, the Chinese Navy's exercises with the navies of other countries in the Asia Pacific are of very low frequency and only touch on the SAR aspect. With very limited training materials, the opportunity to learn and exchange experiences in operational aspects with foreign navies is very limited.

Thus, it can be concluded that from the aspect of training, the Navy's Chinese currently does not support the achievement of the aspirations of a force blue water navy. To get to the blue water navy requires high-intensity training away from the territory of the mother country, and of course, the training must be carried out for years. One good example is him carrying out various exercises in various waters of the world with various foreign navies.

Third, the aspect of industrial and technological support. China's shipping industry is growing to become a competitor to the shipping industry of developed countries. In terms of the warship industry, China has designed and built its ships, both on water ships and warships. China is suspected of studying the design and construction of two former aircraft carriers purchased from Russia to design and build local aircraft carriers.

However, the pace of construction of China's new warships is insignificant. Because according to the information obtained, the
available capacity at various shipyards in the country is used to develop commercial ships. With the current pace of warship construction, the increase in the number of Chinese warships still can be considered normal, except if there is an increase in the capacity of shipyards of Chinese used to build new warships. As for technology, in general, the technology that China is actively studying is aircraft carrier technology. Since no other countries provide the technology, the way to go is to study the two former Russian aircraft carriers. However, the extent to which Chinese engineers master the design of aircraft carriers is still a big question. Meanwhile, other technologies related to the design of ships on water and submarines and weapons technology, and Chinese electronics have long mastered it.

Fourth, the aspect of human resources. The preparation of officers, especially military officers (command line), logistics, equipment, and techniques are carried out specifically through many PLA academies. With such preparation, academically, the crew officer's Chinese Navy have the good potential to develop and are not inferior to Navy officers from other countries. However, how it is developed in the future depends on the system that applies to the Navy. Likewise with the NCOs, where the Chinese Navy has prepared some educational institutions to improve their professionalism. The critical point is precisely the personnel recruited by the military-dominated because most of them come from public education institutions in the
interior of China. On the other hand, the continuous improvement of weapons systems with advanced technology in the Chinese Navy demands reliable human resources to workforce the weapons.

**Conclusion**

In addition to the four aspects that have been described, China’s aspiration to have a blue water navy will also be determined by how capable the Chinese Navy is in exploiting the capabilities of the existing weapons systems in its combat structure.

For example, how to combine the operational capabilities of ships, especially on the water, with submarines in a wide area of operation. The integration of these capabilities is determined, among other things, by the ability to carry out command and control. Likewise, with the exploitation of aircraft carriers, if in 2020-2030, the country will produce domestically-made aircraft carriers. The Chinese Navy will likely have no trouble finding suitable fighter aircraft to fill the air power on the ship, but how far the carrier can be exploited remains a fundamental question. Because there is a basic premise regarding aircraft carriers, having an aircraft carrier in the Navy's combat structure is not always directly proportional to the birth of a blue water navy.

Several examples around the world show that most navies operating aircraft carriers are not classified as blue water navies, such
as the Italian, Spanish and Thai navies. In addition, economically operating an aircraft carrier is not easy, despite its enormous political prestige.

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Declaration of Conflict Interest

The Author(s) declare(s) that there is no conflict of interest regarding the publication of this article (Please include such a declaration in this section if you use English).

Biography

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